AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

tfx_bval

def

Temporal fair division under the identical-days setting (arXiv 2607.17224, arXiv 2601.12835): two agents, T rounds, and in every round one fresh copy of each of m good types arrives (so all rounds carry identical sets of goods). An allocation σ gives the copy of type g arriving in round s to agent σ s g. tfx_bval v σ t i j is agent i's (additive) value for the cumulative bundle of agent j after rounds 0, …, t.

Statement

open Finset in
noncomputable def tfx_bval {T m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin T → Fin m → Fin 2)
    (t : ℕ) (i j : Fin 2) : ℝ
Defined in
Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Structured Constraints (arXiv:2607.17224), Definitions 3, 4 and 8, Theorem 3 and the open question on the approximation ratio of TEFX under identical days (also arXiv:2601.12835); formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
Verified
05 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Used by 8
  • tfx_round2ARound 2 of the counterexample after round-1 allocation 1, 1, 0.
  • tfx_round3_1Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 1, 1, 0 and 1, 0, 1: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
  • tfx_round3_2Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 1, 1, 0 and 0, 0, 1: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
  • tfx_round3_3Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 0, 0, 1 and 1, 1, 0: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
  • tfx_round1Round 1 of the counterexample: the agent receiving b must receive nothing else.
  • tfx_alphaEFXAtα-EFX of the cumulative allocation after round t: for all agents i ≠ j and every good (copy of type g from round s ≤ t) in j's bundle,…
  • tfx_round3_4Round 3 of the counterexample after rounds 1–2 allocations 0, 0, 1 and 0, 1, 0: every allocation of the third round violates α-EFX.
  • tfx_round2BRound 2 of the counterexample after round-1 allocation 0, 0, 1.

Lean source view module on GitHub

open Finset in
/-- Temporal fair division under the identical-days setting (arXiv 2607.17224, arXiv 2601.12835): two agents, `T` rounds, and in every round one fresh copy of each of `m` good types arrives (so all rounds carry identical sets of goods). An allocation `σ` gives the copy of type `g` arriving in round `s` to agent `σ s g`. `tfx_bval v σ t i j` is agent `i`'s (additive) value for the cumulative bundle of agent `j` after rounds `0, …, t`. -/
noncomputable def tfx_bval {T m : ℕ} (v : Fin 2 → Fin m → ℝ) (σ : Fin T → Fin m → Fin 2)
    (t : ℕ) (i j : Fin 2) : ℝ :=
  ∑ s : Fin T, ∑ g : Fin m, if s.val ≤ t ∧ σ s g = j then v i g else 0
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