Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iff
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The item is withheld exactly when the winning bid is below the reserve.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [DecidableEq I] [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iff {reserve : U} {b : I → U} : allocation reserve b = none ↔ b (SecondPrice.winner b) < reserve
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iff`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iff← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iff (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:142): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom…
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [DecidableEq I] [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- The item is withheld exactly when the winning bid is below the reserve. -/lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iff {reserve : U} {b : I → U} : allocation reserve b = none ↔ b (SecondPrice.winner b) < reserve := by unfold allocation by_cases h : reserve ≤ b (SecondPrice.winner b) · simp [h, not_lt_of_ge h] · have hlt : b (SecondPrice.winner b) < reserve := lt_of_not_ge h simp [h, hlt]