Auction.SecondPrice.winner
defimported Lean
The winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses Auction.argmaxBid from MechanismDesign.Auction.AuctionBasic.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.winner (b : I → U) : I
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.winner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.winner← Auction.SecondPrice.winner (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:75): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Used by 21
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_some_winner_iffThe allocation is the second-price winner exactly when the winner's bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_some_iffThe allocation is
some iexactly when the reserve is met andiis the second-price winner. - Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winnerThe winner's bid is at least the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.mechanismThe second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU(their type space is homogeneous:T i = U). -… - Auction.SecondPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gtAuction.SecondPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt
- Auction.SecondPrice.bid_winner_eq_maxBidAuction.SecondPrice.bid_winner_eq_maxBid
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocationThe item is sold exactly when the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_bid_winner_of_allocation_eq_someIf the item is allocated, then the winning bid meets the reserve.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_winnerIf
iis the winner, utility isv i − secondPrice b. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someWhen the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winnerAuction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner
- Auction.SecondPrice.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_if_loserAuction.SecondPrice.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_if_loser
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonneg utility.
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_someWhen bidder
ireceives the item, the clearing price is the maximum of the reserve and the highest bid excludingi. - Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loserIf
iis not the winner, utility is0. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.allocation_eq_none_iffThe item is withheld exactly when the winning bid is below the reserve.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_selfAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.winner_eq_of_allocation_eq_someIf bidder
iis allocated the item, theniis the second-price winner. - Auction.SecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a second-price auction: winner getsv i − secondPrice b, losers get0.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- The winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses `Auction.argmaxBid` from `MechanismDesign.Auction.AuctionBasic`. -/ noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.winner (b : I → U) : I := Auction.argmaxBid b