AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.SecondPrice.winner

defimported Lean

The winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses Auction.argmaxBid from MechanismDesign.Auction.AuctionBasic.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.winner (b : I → U) : I
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.winner`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
Used by 21

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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
/-- The winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses `Auction.argmaxBid` from `MechanismDesign.Auction.AuctionBasic`. -/
noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.winner (b : I → U) : I := Auction.argmaxBid b
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