AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

The winner's bid is at least the second price.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
lemma Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (b : I → U) : secondPrice b ≤ b (winner b)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 7
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- The winner's bid is at least the second price. -/lemma Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (b : I → U) : secondPrice b ≤ b (winner b) := by  unfold secondPrice winner  calc Auction.maxBidExcluding b (Auction.argmaxBid b)      ≤ Auction.maxBid b := Auction.maxBidExcluding_le_maxBid b _    _ = b (Auction.argmaxBid b) := (Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBid b).symm
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