Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The winner's bid is at least the second price.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (b : I → U) : secondPrice b ≤ b (winner b)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner← Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:105): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Auction.maxBidExcluding_le_maxBidExcluding any bidder can only decrease the highest bid.
- Auction.maxBidExcludingThe highest bid excluding bidder
i. - Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBidThe argmax bidder's bid equals the highest bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.maxBidThe highest bid in a profile.
- Used by 2
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someWhen the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonneg utility.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] inomit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in/-- The winner's bid is at least the second price. -/lemma Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winner (b : I → U) : secondPrice b ≤ b (winner b) := by unfold secondPrice winner calc Auction.maxBidExcluding b (Auction.argmaxBid b) ≤ Auction.maxBid b := Auction.maxBidExcluding_le_maxBid b _ _ = b (Auction.argmaxBid b) := (Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBid b).symm