Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPrice
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The clearing price is at least the reserve.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPrice (reserve : U) (b : I → U) : reserve ≤ clearingPrice reserve b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPrice`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPrice← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPrice (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:84): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- The clearing price is at least the reserve. -/ lemma Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPrice (reserve : U) (b : I → U) : reserve ≤ clearingPrice reserve b := le_max_left reserve (SecondPrice.secondPrice b)