Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice
defimported Lean
The price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice (reserve : U) (b : I → U) : U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice← Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/ReserveVickrey.lean:79): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPriceThe second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
- Used by 15
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder pays the clearing price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loserAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_loser
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game reserve vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism reserve. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_winnerAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_winner
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_of_allocation_ne_someA bidder who is not allocated the item pays zero.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonnegative utility.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanismThe reserve second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU. The allocation isnonewhen the reserve is… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
i: the allocated bidder receives value minus the clearing price; all others receive0. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantTruthful bidding dominates any other bid in the reserve second-price auction.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someWhen the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder never pays more than her reported bid.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_someWhen bidder
ireceives the item, the clearing price is the maximum of the reserve and the highest bid excludingi. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.secondPrice_le_clearingPriceThe clearing price is at least the second price.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRuleAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPriceThe clearing price is at least the reserve.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- The price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price. -/ noncomputable def Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice (reserve : U) (b : I → U) : U := max reserve (SecondPrice.secondPrice b)