Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice
defimported Lean
The second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice (b : I → U) : U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice← Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:78): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- Auction.maxBidExcludingThe highest bid excluding bidder
i. - Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom…
- Auction.maxBidExcludingThe highest bid excluding bidder
- Used by 12
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winnerThe winner's bid is at least the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.mechanismThe second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU(their type space is homogeneous:T i = U). -… - Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes… - Auction.SecondPrice.utility_winnerIf
iis the winner, utility isv i − secondPrice b. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someWhen the item is sold, the clearing price is no more than the allocated bidder's bid.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPriceThe price paid by the winner: the maximum of the reserve and the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_nonnegTruthful bidding yields nonneg utility.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.clearingPrice_eq_max_reserve_excluding_of_allocation_eq_someWhen bidder
ireceives the item, the clearing price is the maximum of the reserve and the highest bid excludingi. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.secondPrice_le_clearingPriceThe clearing price is at least the second price.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utility_loserIf
iis not the winner, utility is0. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.reserve_le_clearingPriceThe clearing price is at least the reserve.
- Auction.SecondPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a second-price auction: winner getsv i − secondPrice b, losers get0.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- The second price: the highest bid among all bidders other than the winner. -/ noncomputable def Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice (b : I → U) : U := Auction.maxBidExcluding b (winner b)