Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [DecidableEq I] [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner (b : I → U) (j : I) : b j ≤ b (winner b)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner← Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Vickrey.lean:90): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom…
- Used by 1
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
b, replacingi's bid withv idoes…
- Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominantVickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [DecidableEq I] [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.SecondPrice.bid_le_bid_winner (b : I → U) (j : I) : b j ≤ b (winner b) := Auction.bid_le_maxBid b j