AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Vickrey's Theorem (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile b, replacing i's bid with v i does not decrease i's utility.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in
variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in
variable {v : I → U} in
theorem Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant (v : I → U) (i : I) (b : I → U) :
    utility v b i ≤ utility v (Function.update b i (v i)) i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 12

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] invariable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] invariable {v : I → U} in/-- **Vickrey's Theorem** (core form): Truthful bidding dominates any other bid. For any bid profile `b`, replacing `i`'s bid with `v i` does not decrease `i`'s utility. -/theorem Auction.SecondPrice.valuation_is_dominant (v : I → U) (i : I) (b : I → U) :    utility v b i ≤ utility v (Function.update b i (v i)) i := by  -- Key: maxBidExcluding is unchanged by updating i's bid  have key : maxBidExcluding (Function.update b i (v i)) i = maxBidExcluding b i :=    maxBidExcluding_update_self b i (v i)  by_cases h1 : i = winner b  · -- Case 1: i wins with current bid b    rw [utility_winner h1]    by_cases h2 : i = winner (Function.update b i (v i))    · -- Case 1a: i also wins with truthful bid — same maxBidExcluding, same payoff      rw [utility_winner h2, sub_le_sub_iff_left]      show secondPrice (Function.update b i (v i)) ≤ secondPrice b      simp only [secondPrice, ← h1, ← h2, key, le_refl]    · -- Case 1b: i loses with truthful bid — utility becomes 0      rw [utility_loser h2, sub_nonpos]      -- Goal: v i ≤ secondPrice b = maxBidExcluding b (winner b) = maxBidExcluding b i      show v i ≤ secondPrice b      rw [secondPrice, ← h1]      -- Goal: v i ≤ maxBidExcluding b i      set b' := Function.update b i (v i)      have hle := bid_le_bid_winner b' i      have hmbe := maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_if_loser (b := b') h2      rw [bid_winner_eq_maxBid b', ← hmbe, key] at hle      rwa [show b' i = v i from Function.update_self i (v i) b] at hle  · -- Case 2: i loses with current bid b — utility = 0    rw [utility_loser h1]    -- Truthful bid gives nonneg utility    exact utility_nonneg (Function.update_self i (v i) b)
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