BayesianMechanism.Strategy
abbrevimported Lean
A pure reporting strategy in an incomplete-information mechanism: an agent maps each possible true type to a report/message.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {O : Type*} in abbrev BayesianMechanism.Strategy (Tᵢ : Type*) (Mᵢ : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianMechanism.Strategy`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianMechanism.Strategy← BayesianMechanism.Strategy (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBayesian.lean:78): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 3
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviateDeviating from a strategy profile at one agent.
- BayesianMechanism.StrategyProfileA strategy profile for all agents in an incomplete-information mechanism.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principleRevelation principle, ex-ante form: if
σis a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {O : Type*} in /-- A pure reporting strategy in an incomplete-information mechanism: an agent maps each possible true type to a report/message. -/ abbrev BayesianMechanism.Strategy (Tᵢ : Type*) (Mᵢ : Type*) := Tᵢ → Mᵢ