BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Revelation principle, ex-ante form: if σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the induced direct mechanism. This is the ex-ante version because IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium above is defined via ex-ante expected utility rather than interim conditional utility. References: * [Myerson 1979, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem"] * [Krishna 2010, Ch. 5]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in omit [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in theorem BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle [DecidableEq I] [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (M i)] (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P) (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ) (σ : StrategyProfile T M) (hσ : B.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium u σ) : B.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusion u σ
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle← BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBayesian.lean:309): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 19
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.directRevelationThe direct-revelation mechanism induced by an indirect mechanism and a strategy profile. An agent reports their type directly; the…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusionThe revelation-principle target property attached to a strategy profile. This packages the statement we will eventually want to prove: if…
- DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategyTruthful reporting in a direct Bayesian mechanism with transfers.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfersA transfer mechanism in an incomplete-information environment. As in
MechanismWithTransfers, the allocation and payment rules are stored… - BayesianMechanism.inducedMessagesThe message profile induced by a true type profile and a strategy profile.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.directRevelation_allocation_truthfulUnder truthful reporting in the induced direct mechanism, the realized allocation agrees definitionally with the original mechanism played…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.directRevelation_payments_truthfulUnder truthful reporting in the induced direct mechanism, the realized payment vector agrees definitionally with the original mechanism…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviateDeviating from a strategy profile at one agent.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibriumAn ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a transfer mechanism. No agent can improve their ex-ante expected utility by replacing their…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedAllocationThe allocation induced by a strategy profile and a realized type profile.
- BayesianMechanism.StrategyA pure reporting strategy in an incomplete-information mechanism: an agent maps each possible true type to a report/message.
- BayesianMechanism.IsMeasurableStrategyProfileA measurable strategy profile for all agents in an incomplete-information mechanism.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedPaymentsThe payment vector induced by a strategy profile and a realized type profile.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.StrategyProfileA pure reporting strategy profile for a Bayesian transfer mechanism.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtilityEx-ante expected utility of agent
iunder a strategy profile. The utility rule is supplied externally, as inMechanismWithTransfers:… - BayesianMechanism.StrategyProfileA strategy profile for all agents in an incomplete-information mechanism.
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] invariable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} inomit [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in/-- Revelation principle, ex-ante form: if `σ` is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the induced direct mechanism. This is the ex-ante version because `IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium` above is defined via ex-ante expected utility rather than interim conditional utility. References: * [Myerson 1979, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem"] * [Krishna 2010, Ch. 5] -/theorem BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle [DecidableEq I] [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (M i)] (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P) (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ) (σ : StrategyProfile T M) (hσ : B.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium u σ) : B.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusion u σ := by rcases hσ with ⟨hσ_meas, hσ_eq⟩ constructor · intro i rw [DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy] apply measurable_id · intro i report hreport specialize hσ_eq i (fun t => σ i (report t)) ((hσ_meas i).comp hreport) rw [(by unfold BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility apply MeasureTheory.integral_congr_ae filter_upwards with t simp only [BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedAllocation, BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedPayments] apply congrArg₂ (fun a p => u (B.allocationRule a) (B.paymentRule p) t i) all_goals ext j by_cases h : j = i · subst h simp [BayesianMechanism.inducedMessages, BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate] · simp [BayesianMechanism.inducedMessages, BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate, DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy, h] : (B.directRevelation σ).exAnteExpectedUtility u (deviate DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy i report) i = B.exAnteExpectedUtility u (deviate σ i (fun t => σ i (report t))) i), (by unfold BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility apply MeasureTheory.integral_congr_ae filter_upwards with t rfl : (B.directRevelation σ).exAnteExpectedUtility u DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy i = B.exAnteExpectedUtility u σ i)] assumption