AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Revelation principle, ex-ante form: if σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the induced direct mechanism. This is the ex-ante version because IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium above is defined via ex-ante expected utility rather than interim conditional utility. References: * [Myerson 1979, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem"] * [Krishna 2010, Ch. 5]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in
variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in
omit [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in
theorem BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle
    [DecidableEq I]
    [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)]
    [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (M i)]
    (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P)
    (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ)
    (σ : StrategyProfile T M)
    (hσ : B.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium u σ) :
    B.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusion u σ
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 19

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] invariable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} inomit [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in/-- Revelation principle, ex-ante form: if `σ` is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the induced direct mechanism. This is the ex-ante version because `IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium` above is defined via ex-ante expected utility rather than interim conditional utility. References: * [Myerson 1979, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem"] * [Krishna 2010, Ch. 5] -/theorem BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principle    [DecidableEq I]    [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)]    [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (M i)]    (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P)    (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ)    (σ : StrategyProfile T M)    (hσ : B.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium u σ) :    B.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusion u σ := by  rcases hσ with ⟨hσ_meas, hσ_eq⟩  constructor  · intro i    rw [DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy]    apply measurable_id  · intro i report hreport    specialize hσ_eq i (fun t => σ i (report t)) ((hσ_meas i).comp hreport)    rw [(by        unfold BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility        apply MeasureTheory.integral_congr_ae        filter_upwards with t        simp only [BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedAllocation,          BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedPayments]        apply congrArg₂ (fun a p => u (B.allocationRule a) (B.paymentRule p) t i)        all_goals          ext j          by_cases h : j = i          · subst h            simp [BayesianMechanism.inducedMessages, BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate]          · simp [BayesianMechanism.inducedMessages, BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate,              DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy, h] :        (B.directRevelation σ).exAnteExpectedUtility u            (deviate DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy i report) i =          B.exAnteExpectedUtility u (deviate σ i (fun t => σ i (report t))) i),      (by        unfold BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility        apply MeasureTheory.integral_congr_ae        filter_upwards with t        rfl :        (B.directRevelation σ).exAnteExpectedUtility u            DirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers.truthfulStrategy i =          B.exAnteExpectedUtility u σ i)]    assumption
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