BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate
defimported Lean
Deviating from a strategy profile at one agent.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in def BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate [DecidableEq I] (σ : StrategyProfile T M) (i : I) (τ : T i → M i) : StrategyProfile T M
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate← BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBayesian.lean:164): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- BayesianMechanism.StrategyA pure reporting strategy in an incomplete-information mechanism: an agent maps each possible true type to a report/message.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.StrategyProfileA pure reporting strategy profile for a Bayesian transfer mechanism.
- Used by 2
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibriumAn ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a transfer mechanism. No agent can improve their ex-ante expected utility by replacing their…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principleRevelation principle, ex-ante form: if
σis a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in /-- Deviating from a strategy profile at one agent. -/ def BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviate [DecidableEq I] (σ : StrategyProfile T M) (i : I) (τ : T i → M i) : StrategyProfile T M := Function.update σ i τ