BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility
defimported Lean
Ex-ante expected utility of agent i under a strategy profile. The utility rule is supplied externally, as in MechanismWithTransfers: it depends on the induced allocation, the induced payments, the realized true type profile, and the agent index.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P) (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ) (σ : StrategyProfile T M) (i : I) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility← BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBayesian.lean:192): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 4
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfersA transfer mechanism in an incomplete-information environment. As in
MechanismWithTransfers, the allocation and payment rules are stored… - BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedAllocationThe allocation induced by a strategy profile and a realized type profile.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.inducedPaymentsThe payment vector induced by a strategy profile and a realized type profile.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.StrategyProfileA pure reporting strategy profile for a Bayesian transfer mechanism.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfersA transfer mechanism in an incomplete-information environment. As in
- Used by 2
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibriumAn ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a transfer mechanism. No agent can improve their ex-ante expected utility by replacing their…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principleRevelation principle, ex-ante form: if
σis a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in /-- Ex-ante expected utility of agent `i` under a strategy profile. The utility rule is supplied externally, as in `MechanismWithTransfers`: it depends on the induced allocation, the induced payments, the realized true type profile, and the agent index. -/ noncomputable def BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtility (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P) (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ) (σ : StrategyProfile T M) (i : I) : ℝ := ∫ t, u (B.inducedAllocation σ t) (B.inducedPayments σ t) t i ∂B.prior