BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium
defimported Lean
An ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a transfer mechanism. No agent can improve their ex-ante expected utility by replacing their reporting rule with any other measurable pure type-contingent reporting rule. This is the ex-ante notion: expectations are taken under the full prior, not conditional on agent i's realized type. The standard interim BNE notion from mechanism design is a natural future extension.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in def BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium [DecidableEq I] [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (M i)] (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P) (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ) (σ : StrategyProfile T M) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium← BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBayesian.lean:213): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 8
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfersA transfer mechanism in an incomplete-information environment. As in
MechanismWithTransfers, the allocation and payment rules are stored… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.deviateDeviating from a strategy profile at one agent.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- BayesianMechanism.IsMeasurableStrategyProfileA measurable strategy profile for all agents in an incomplete-information mechanism.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.StrategyProfileA pure reporting strategy profile for a Bayesian transfer mechanism.
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnteExpectedUtilityEx-ante expected utility of agent
iunder a strategy profile. The utility rule is supplied externally, as inMechanismWithTransfers:…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfersA transfer mechanism in an incomplete-information environment. As in
- Used by 2
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.ExAnteRevelationPrincipleConclusionThe revelation-principle target property attached to a strategy profile. This packages the statement we will eventually want to prove: if…
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.exAnte_revelation_principleRevelation principle, ex-ante form: if
σis a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} {T : I → Type*} [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (T i)] in variable {M : I → Type*} {A P : Type*} in /-- An ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a transfer mechanism. No agent can improve their ex-ante expected utility by replacing their reporting rule with any other measurable pure type-contingent reporting rule. This is the ex-ante notion: expectations are taken under the full prior, not conditional on agent `i`'s realized type. The standard interim BNE notion from mechanism design is a natural future extension. -/ def BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.IsExAnteBayesianNashEquilibrium [DecidableEq I] [∀ i, MeasurableSpace (M i)] (B : BayesianMechanismWithTransfers I T M A P) (u : A → (I → P) → (∀ i, T i) → I → ℝ) (σ : StrategyProfile T M) : Prop := BayesianMechanism.IsMeasurableStrategyProfile σ ∧ ∀ (i : I) (τ : T i → M i), Measurable τ → B.exAnteExpectedUtility u (deviate σ i τ) i ≤ B.exAnteExpectedUtility u σ i