CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetric
defimported Lean
Two players are symmetric if swapping them doesn't change any coalition's worth.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in def CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetric (i j : N) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetric`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetric← CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetric (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/ShapleyValue.lean:42): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
- Used by 1
- CoalitionalGame.SatisfiesSymmetryA solution concept satisfies symmetry. [MSZ 18.4]
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in /-- Two players are symmetric if swapping them doesn't change any coalition's worth. -/ def CoalitionalGame.AreSymmetric (i j : N) : Prop := ∀ S : Finset N, i ∉ S → j ∉ S → G.v (insert i S) = G.v (insert j S)