CoalitionalGame.marginalContrib
defimported Lean
The marginal contribution of player i to coalition S (where i ∉ S).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in def CoalitionalGame.marginalContrib (i : N) (S : Finset N) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.marginalContrib`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.marginalContrib← CoalitionalGame.marginalContrib (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/ShapleyValue.lean:38): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
- Used by 1
- CoalitionalGame.shapleyValueThe Shapley value of player
i. [MSZ 18.14, 18.17]φᵢ(v) = ∑_{S ⊆ N{i}} |S|!(|N|-|S|-1)!/|N|! · (v(S∪{i}) - v(S))
- CoalitionalGame.shapleyValueThe Shapley value of player
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] [Fintype N] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) in /-- The marginal contribution of player `i` to coalition `S` (where `i ∉ S`). -/ def CoalitionalGame.marginalContrib (i : N) (S : Finset N) : ℝ := G.v (insert i S) - G.v S