AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isTwoThirdsConvex

theoremverified

Every convex coalitional game with real characteristic function is 2/3-convex.

Statement

theorem CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isTwoThirdsConvex {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ)
    (hconv : G.IsConvex) : G.IsTwoThirdsConvex
Source
arXiv:2611.16207, Core nonemptiness for 2/3-convex games, Section 2
Verified
16 Nov 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 3
  • CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvexA transferable-utility game G with real characteristic function v on a finite set of players N is 2/3-convex if for every triple of…
  • CoalitionalGame.IsConvexA game is convex if it satisfies the supermodularity condition. [MSZ 17.51] Requires [LE U] (addition comes from [AddZeroClass U]).
  • CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with…

Read back from the Lean

For any type N with decidable equality, and any coalitional game G over N with characteristic values in ℝ (a structure with a characteristic function v : Finset N → ℝ such that v ∅ = 0), if G satisfies CoalitionalGame.IsConvex, then G satisfies CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvex.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

The proof, explained

A coalitional game is convex if the supermodularity inequality v(S ∪ T) + v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S) + v(T) holds for all pairs of coalitions S, T, and 2/3-convex if for every triple of distinct coalitions the inequality holds for at least two of the three pairs. Since convexity guarantees the inequality holds for every pair without restriction, it holds in particular for {S₁, S₂} and {S₁, S₃}, immediately satisfying the first branch of the 2/3-convexity disjunction.

  1. Let S₁, S₂, and S₃ be three pairwise distinct coalitions.

    Unfolding the definition of 2/3-convexity, we introduce three arbitrary coalitions S₁, S₂, S₃ and the assumptions that they are pairwise distinct. (The distinctness assumptions are ignored, as the inequality holds universally.)

    line 4

      intro S₁ S₂ S₃ _ _ _
  2. The 2/3-convexity condition holds for S₁, S₂, and S₃.

    Because the game is convex, the supermodularity inequality v(A ∪ B) + v(A ∩ B) ≥ v(A) + v(B) holds for any two coalitions A and B. Specialising this to the pairs (S₁, S₂) and (S₁, S₃) satisfies both parts of the first conjunction, which establishes the first branch of the three-way disjunction via Or.inl.

    line 5

    uses Or.inl

      exact Or.inl ⟨hconv S₁ S₂, hconv S₁ S₃⟩
Or.inl
A disjunction A ∨ B holds whenever its left disjunct A holds.

Written by a model (gemini-3.8-flash) from the Lean proof and the goal states Lean reported at each step. Lean verified the proof; this explanation is a reading aid and is not itself machine-checked.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Every convex coalitional game is 2/3-convex. -/theorem CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isTwoThirdsConvex {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ)    (hconv : G.IsConvex) : G.IsTwoThirdsConvex := by  intro S₁ S₂ S₃ _ _ _  exact Or.inl ⟨hconv S₁ S₂, hconv S₁ S₃⟩
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