CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvex
A transferable-utility game G with real characteristic function v on a finite set of players N is 2/3-convex if for every triple of distinct coalitions S₁, S₂, S₃ ⊆ N, at least two of the three pairs satisfy the supermodular inequality v(Sᵢ ∪ Sⱼ) + v(Sᵢ ∩ Sⱼ) ≥ v(Sᵢ) + v(Sⱼ).
Statement
def CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvex {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2611.16207, Core nonemptiness for 2/3-convex games, Definition 1
- Verified
- 16 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
- Used by 4
- op_1641_convex_implies_two_thirds_convex_and_superadditiveEvery convex coalitional game with real characteristic function is both 2/3-convex and superadditive.
- op_1641_counterexample_three_players_existsThere exists a superadditive 2/3-convex coalitional game on 3 players whose Shapley value does not belong to its core.
- CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isTwoThirdsConvexEvery convex coalitional game with real characteristic function is 2/3-convex.
- op_1641_two_thirds_convex_shapley_in_core_negationIt is not the case that for every finite player set N with at least 3 players, the Shapley value of every superadditive 2/3-convex…
Read back from the Lean
For a type N with decidable equality and a real-valued coalitional game G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ, CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvex G asserts that for every triple of finite subsets S₁, S₂, S₃ : Finset N, if they are pairwise distinct (S₁ ≠ S₂, S₁ ≠ S₃, and S₂ ≠ S₃), then at least two of the three pairs {S₁, S₂}, {S₁, S₃}, and {S₂, S₃} satisfy the supermodularity/convexity inequality G.v (A ∪ B) + G.v (A ∩ B) ≥ G.v A + G.v B. That is, at least one of the three conjunctions holds:
1. The inequality holds for both (S₁, S₂) and (S₁, S₃);
2. The inequality holds for both (S₁, S₂) and (S₂, S₃);
3. The inequality holds for both (S₁, S₃) and (S₂, S₃).
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- A coalitional game is 2/3-convex if at least two of any three distinct coalitions satisfy the supermodular inequality. -/ def CoalitionalGame.IsTwoThirdsConvex {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] (G : CoalitionalGame N ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (S₁ S₂ S₃ : Finset N), S₁ ≠ S₂ → S₁ ≠ S₃ → S₂ ≠ S₃ → (G.v (S₁ ∪ S₂) + G.v (S₁ ∩ S₂) ≥ G.v S₁ + G.v S₂ ∧ G.v (S₁ ∪ S₃) + G.v (S₁ ∩ S₃) ≥ G.v S₁ + G.v S₃) ∨ (G.v (S₁ ∪ S₂) + G.v (S₁ ∩ S₂) ≥ G.v S₁ + G.v S₂ ∧ G.v (S₂ ∪ S₃) + G.v (S₂ ∩ S₃) ≥ G.v S₂ + G.v S₃) ∨ (G.v (S₁ ∪ S₃) + G.v (S₁ ∩ S₃) ≥ G.v S₁ + G.v S₃ ∧ G.v (S₂ ∪ S₃) + G.v (S₂ ∩ S₃) ≥ G.v S₂ + G.v S₃)