AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic

defimported Lean

A game is monotonic if larger coalitions are worth at least as much. [MSZ 16.10] Requires [LE U].

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in
variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in
def CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic [LE U] : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility. N is the player type; U is the utility type. v assigns a worth to each coalition, with…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in
variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in
/-- A game is monotonic if larger coalitions are worth at least as much. [MSZ 16.10] Requires `[LE U]`. -/
def CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic [LE U] : Prop :=
  ∀ S T : Finset N, S ⊆ T → G.v S ≤ G.v T
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