CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic
defimported Lean
A game is monotonic if larger coalitions are worth at least as much. [MSZ 16.10] Requires [LE U].
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in def CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic [LE U] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic← CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Basic.lean:97): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in /-- A game is monotonic if larger coalitions are worth at least as much. [MSZ 16.10] Requires `[LE U]`. -/ def CoalitionalGame.IsMonotonic [LE U] : Prop := ∀ S T : Finset N, S ⊆ T → G.v S ≤ G.v T