CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditive
defimported Lean
A game is superadditive if the worth of the union of disjoint coalitions is at least the sum of their worths. [MSZ 16.8] Requires [LE U] (addition comes from the [AddZeroClass U] section variable).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in def CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditive [LE U] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditive`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditive← CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditive (EconCSLib/GameTheory/CoalitionalGame/Basic.lean:92): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
Nis the player type;Uis the utility type.vassigns a worth to each coalition, with…
- CoalitionalGameA coalitional game with transferable utility.
- Used by 1
- CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isSuperadditiveConvexity implies superadditivity. The
[LE U]constraint is all that's needed beyond the section's[AddZeroClass U].
- CoalitionalGame.IsConvex.isSuperadditiveConvexity implies superadditivity. The
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N : Type*} [DecidableEq N] {U : Type*} [AddZeroClass U] in variable (G : CoalitionalGame N U) in /-- A game is superadditive if the worth of the union of disjoint coalitions is at least the sum of their worths. [MSZ 16.8] Requires `[LE U]` (addition comes from the `[AddZeroClass U]` section variable). -/ def CoalitionalGame.IsSuperadditive [LE U] : Prop := ∀ S T : Finset N, Disjoint S T → G.v (S ∪ T) ≥ G.v S + G.v T