EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
evaluate_at_mixed G i is continuous in the mixed profile.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Function in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {N : Type*} in variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in lemma EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont (i : N) : Continuous (fun σ : MixedS G => evaluate_at_mixed G i σ)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont← StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Nash.lean:151): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an
abbrevso Lean… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.ProfileThe type of strategy profiles for game
G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixedExpected payoff of player
iunder mixed profileσ. Sums over all pure profiles, weighting by the product of each player's probability. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont
g_function G i (· ) ais continuous in the mixed profile (fixedi,a).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BigOperators Function inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable {N : Type*} invariable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) invariable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] invariable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] invariable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in/-- `evaluate_at_mixed G i` is continuous in the mixed profile. -/lemma EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont (i : N) : Continuous (fun σ : MixedS G => evaluate_at_mixed G i σ) := by unfold evaluate_at_mixed apply continuous_finset_sum intro s _ apply Continuous.mul _ continuous_const apply continuous_finset_prod intro j _ have h1 : Continuous (fun σ : MixedS G => σ j) := continuous_apply j have h2 : Continuous (fun x : stdSimplex ℝ (G.strategy j) => x.val (s j)) := (continuous_apply (s j)).comp continuous_subtype_val exact h2.comp h1