EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
g_function G i (· ) a is continuous in the mixed profile (fixed i, a).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Function in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {N : Type*} in variable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) in variable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] in variable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] in variable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in lemma EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont (i : N) (a : G.strategy i) : Continuous (fun σ : MixedS G => g_function G i σ a)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.g_function_cont`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont← StrategicGame.g_function_cont (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Nash.lean:185): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 9
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an
abbrevso Lean… - stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
i₀. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont
evaluate_at_mixed G iis continuous in the mixed profile. - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixedExpected payoff of player
iunder mixed profileσ. Sums over all pure profiles, weighting by the product of each player's probability. - stdSimplex.pure_applystdSimplex.pure_apply
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_functionAugmented weight for pure strategy
aof playeriat mixed profileσ: the original probabilityσ_i(a)plus the positive part of the… - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_update_cont
σ ↦ evaluate_at_mixed G i (update σ i (stdSimplex.pure a))is continuous.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedSType abbreviation for the product of standard simplices (one per player), used throughout this file. Defined as an
- Used by 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_map_cont
nash_map Gis a continuous self-map of the product simplex.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_map_cont
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BigOperators Function inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable {N : Type*} invariable (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℝ) invariable [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] invariable [∀ i, Fintype (G.strategy i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] invariable [∀ i, Inhabited (G.strategy i)] in/-- `g_function G i (· ) a` is continuous in the mixed profile (fixed `i`, `a`). -/lemma EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont (i : N) (a : G.strategy i) : Continuous (fun σ : MixedS G => g_function G i σ a) := by unfold g_function apply Continuous.add · have h1 : Continuous (fun σ : MixedS G => σ i) := continuous_apply i have h2 : Continuous (fun x : stdSimplex ℝ (G.strategy i) => x.val a) := (continuous_apply a).comp continuous_subtype_val exact h2.comp h1 · apply Continuous.max continuous_const exact (evaluate_at_mixed_update_cont G i a).sub (evaluate_at_mixed_cont G i)