EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile
abbrevimported Lean
The type of strategy profiles for game G: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function ∀ i, G.strategy i. The profile type is bound to the game, making it explicit that a profile belongs to a specific strategic game.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} in abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.Profile`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Claude (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile← StrategicGame.Profile (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Basic.lean:49): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/Basic.lean:49 (StrategicGame.Profile) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@ -/-- The type of strategy profiles for game `G`: each player picks a strategy. - - This is a dependent function `∀ i, G.strategy i`. The profile type is bound to - the game, making it explicit that a profile belongs to a specific strategic game. -/ -abbrev Profile (G : StrategicGame N U) := ∀ i, G.strategy i +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +variable {N U : Type*} in +abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) := ∀ i, G.strategy i - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
- Used by 55
- IsBestResponsePlayer
iis playing a best response to profileσin gameGif no unilateral deviation to any strategys'yields a higher payoff. - IsWeaklyDominant.isBestResponseT2: A weakly dominant strategy is a best response to any profile where player
iplays it. - MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zeroBridge lemma:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1). Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum… - SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44-4.45]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDominanceSolvableA game is dominance-solvable if IESDS yields a unique surviving profile.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.negIn a zero-sum game, player 1's payoff is the negation of player 0's. Purely algebraic: holds in any additive group, no order or field…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.neg'In a zero-sum game, player 0's payoff is the negation of player 1's.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSumA two-player game is zero-sum if payoffs sum to zero at every profile. [MSZ 4.39]
- MatrixGame.toStrategicGame_isZeroSum
A.toStrategicGamesatisfies the abstract zero-sum predicate: by construction player 1's payoff is the negation of player 0's. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.welfareThe social welfare of a profile: the sum of all players' payoffs. Requires
[Fintype N]and[AddCommMonoid U]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidableStrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidable
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Survives.prevSurvival at round n+1 implies survival at round n.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.welfare_eqTwo-player constant-sum games have constant social welfare at every profile.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSumA two-player game is constant-sum if payoffs sum to
cat every profile. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_negIn a zero-sum game, player 1's expected payoff is the negation of player 0's.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_cont
evaluate_at_mixed G iis continuous in the mixed profile. - IsBestResponse.congr_payoffT1: Best response depends only on player
i's payoff column. - StrictlyDominates.weaklyStrict dominance implies weak dominance.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotential.isNash_iff_localMaxNash ↔ local maximizer of ordinal potential.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.nash_payoff_eq_p1In a zero-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 1.
- isNashEq_iffT6: The checker correctly decides Nash equilibrium (soundness and completeness).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- IsNashEquilibriumA profile
σis a pure Nash equilibrium of gameGif every player is playing a best response: no player can profitably deviate. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotentialAn exact potential function: the change in
Φequals the change in the deviating player's payoff. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_eq_mixed_g
evaluate_at_mixedis the restriction ofmixed_gto simplex weights. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsOrdinalPotentialAn ordinal potential function: a unilateral deviation improves payoff iff it increases Φ.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixedExpected payoff of player
iunder mixed profileσ. Sums over all pure profiles, weighting by the product of each player's probability. - WeaklyDominatesStrategy
sweakly dominates strategys'for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_linear
evaluate_at_mixed G iis linear in thei-th mixed strategy: for anyτ : stdSimplex ℝ (G.strategy i),… - IsStrictlyDominant.isWeaklyDominantA strictly dominant strategy is weakly dominant.
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_oneMirror:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 1 = -(A.E (p 0) (p 1)). - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.mixed_gMultilinear payoff functional on raw weight vectors
m : ∀ i, G.strategy i → ℝ. Same asevaluate_at_mixedbut with arbitrary (not… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.isRationalizableNash strategies are rationalizable.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.SurvivesA strategy survives round
nof iterated strict dominance elimination. Round 0: all strategies survive. Round n+1:ssurvives if it… - IsNashEquilibrium.of_dominantT3: If every player has a weakly dominant strategy and
σassigns each player their dominant strategy, thenσis a Nash equilibrium. - StrictlyDominatesStrategy
sstrictly dominates strategys'for playeri. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsDegenerateCorrelatedEqA degenerate correlated equilibrium supported on a single profile. This is the only honest correlated-equilibrium notion currently…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.welfare_eq_zeroTwo-player zero-sum games have zero social welfare at every profile.
- isNashEqExecutable Nash equilibrium checker. Returns
trueiffσis a pure Nash equilibrium ofG. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff for player
whounder mixed profilep.EU(p, who) = ∑_{σ : Profile} (∏_i p_i(σ_i)) · payoff(σ, who)Requires… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateUnilateral deviation in a game-bound profile: player
iswitches tos', while all other players keep their current strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureProfileToMixedEmbed a pure profile as a mixed profile.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsExactPotential.maximizer_is_nashA profile maximizing an exact potential is a Nash equilibrium.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.negIn a constant-sum game, player 1's payoff is
cminus player 0's.AddCommGroupis needed (not justAddGroup): the RHS usesSub,… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsNashEquilibrium.survivesNash equilibrium strategies survive all rounds. [MSZ 4.31]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsConstantSum.nash_payoff_eqIn a constant-sum game, all Nash equilibria yield the same payoff for player 0. [MSZ Theorem 4.44–4.45]
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_update_cont
σ ↦ evaluate_at_mixed G i (update σ i (stdSimplex.pure a))is continuous. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_iff_degenerate_ceA profile is a "degenerate" correlated equilibrium (point mass on one profile) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium.
- IsBestResponsePlayer
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} in /-- The type of strategy profiles for game `G`: each player picks a strategy. This is a dependent function `∀ i, G.strategy i`. The profile type is bound to the game, making it explicit that a profile belongs to a specific strategic game. -/ abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) := ∀ i, G.strategy i