stdSimplex.pure_apply
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
stdSimplex.pure_apply
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {π : Type*} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in @[simp] theorem stdSimplex.pure_apply [DecidableEq I] (iβ i : I) : (stdSimplex.pure (π := π) iβ).val i = if i = iβ then 1 else 0
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `stdSimplex.pure_apply`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.stdSimplex.pure_apply← stdSimplex.pure_apply (EconCSLib/Math/Simplex.lean:314): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 1
- stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
iβ.
- stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
- Used by 27
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs β saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) à Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddle⦠- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_map_cont
nash_map Gis a continuous self-map of the product simplex. - VNM.NotComplete.not_completeVNM.NotComplete.not_complete
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_nonnegThe augmented weight is nonnegative.
- MatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eqMatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eq
- VNM.NotContinuous.not_continuousVNM.NotContinuous.not_continuous
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_mapThe Nash best-response map: sends a mixed profile
Οto the profile where each playeriplays proportional tog_function i Ο. A fixedβ¦ - MatrixGame.support_complementarity_columnSupport complementarity (column). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every columnjwith positive probability underyyis a best⦠- le_iff_simplex_le
f β€ vpointwise iff every simplex weighted sum isβ€ v. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_map_auxThe normalized augmented weight:
g_function i Ο a / β_b g_function i Ο b. Private auxiliary used to constructnash_map. - Lottery.expectedValue_pureExpected value of a pure lottery equals the outcome value.
- wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_linear
evaluate_at_mixed G iis linear in thei-th mixed strategy: for anyΟ : stdSimplex β (G.strategy i),β¦ - MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_leA column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
- Lottery.pureA pure (degenerate) lottery: outcome
oβwith probability 1. Alias ofstdSimplex.pure. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.nash_map_certThe normalized augmented weights form a valid probability distribution on
G.strategy i. - MatrixGame.image_optimalRowStrategies_eqThe image of the row-optimal subtype set equals the H-representation polytope
A.optimalRowSet. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_functionAugmented weight for pure strategy
aof playeriat mixed profileΟ: the original probabilityΟ_i(a)plus the positive part of theβ¦ - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.g_function_cont
g_function G i (Β· ) ais continuous in the mixed profile (fixedi,a). - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.sigma_le_g_functionThe augmented weight is at least
Ο_i(a). - MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_geA row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value.
- one_player_extension_approx_nashIn an (r+1)-player normal-form game with payoff functions u : Fin (r + 1) β ((j : Fin (r + 1)) β A j) β β taking values in [0, 1]β¦
- MatrixGame.support_complementarity_rowSupport complementarity (row). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every rowiwith positive probability underxxis a best response⦠- IsRiskNeutral.isAffineRisk neutrality implies affine utility. [MSZ 2.27, hard direction] Requires
|I| β₯ 2so that non-trivial distributions exist. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.evaluate_at_mixed_update_cont
Ο β¦ evaluate_at_mixed G i (update Ο i (stdSimplex.pure a))is continuous. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.one_le_sum_gThe sum of augmented weights is at least 1.
- ge_iff_simplex_ge
f β₯ vpointwise iff every simplex weighted sum isβ₯ v.
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs β saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {π : Type*} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in @[simp] theorem stdSimplex.pure_apply [DecidableEq I] (iβ i : I) : (stdSimplex.pure (π := π) iβ).val i = if i = iβ then 1 else 0 := rfl