EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A point-mass mixed strategy is not completely mixed when there is another pure strategy available.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℚ} {i : N} [Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] {s₀ s₁ : G.strategy i} (h : s₁ ≠ s₀) : ¬ IsCompletelyMixed G (pureToMixed (G := G) (i := i) s₀)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne← StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:142): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:142 (StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -/-- A point-mass mixed strategy is not completely mixed when there is another - pure strategy available. -/ -theorem pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne {G : StrategicGame N ℚ} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℚ} {i : N} [Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixedEmbed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsCompletelyMixedA player's mixed strategy is completely mixed if every pure strategy is assigned positive probability. This is the strategic-form…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators invariable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in/-- A point-mass mixed strategy is not completely mixed when there is another pure strategy available. -/theorem EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_ne {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N ℚ} {i : N} [Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] {s₀ s₁ : G.strategy i} (h : s₁ ≠ s₀) : ¬ IsCompletelyMixed G (pureToMixed (G := G) (i := i) s₀) := by intro hcm have hpos := hcm s₁ simp [pureToMixed, h] at hpos