EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategy
abbrevimported Lean
A mixed strategy for player i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires [Fintype (G.strategy i)] but NOT [Fintype N].
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategy (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (i : N) [Fintype (G.strategy i)]
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.MixedStrategy`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategy← StrategicGame.MixedStrategy (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:53): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategy--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:53 (StrategicGame.MixedStrategy) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ -/-- A mixed strategy for player `i`: a probability distribution over pure strategies. - Requires `[Fintype (G.strategy i)]` but NOT `[Fintype N]`. -/ -abbrev MixedStrategy (G : StrategicGame N U) (i : N) [Fintype (G.strategy i)] := +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategy (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (i : N) [Fintype (G.strategy i)] := stdSimplex U (G.strategy i) - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
- Used by 16
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_neA point-mass mixed strategy is not completely mixed when there is another pure strategy available.
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zeroBridge lemma:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1). Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum… - MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixedEmbed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass).
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixedDeviate player
whoto pure strategys', keeping others' mixed strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.uniformMixed_posEvery pure strategy has positive probability under the uniform mixed strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_negIn a zero-sum game, player 1's expected payoff is the negation of player 0's.
- MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zeroMatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.uniformMixed_applyThe uniform mixed strategy assigns
1 / cardto every pure strategy. - MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_oneMirror:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 1 = -(A.E (p 0) (p 1)). - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.uniformMixedThe uniform mixed strategy over a finite nonempty strategy set.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsCompletelyMixedA player's mixed strategy is completely mixed if every pure strategy is assigned positive probability. This is the strategic-form…
- MatrixGame.toMixedProfileBuild a
MixedProfileoftoStrategicGamefrom a saddle-point pair. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff for player
whounder mixed profilep.EU(p, who) = ∑_{σ : Profile} (∏_i p_i(σ_i)) · payoff(σ, who)Requires… - MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_oneMatrixGame.toMixedProfile_one
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfileA mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on
N(player set can be arbitrary).
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in /-- A mixed strategy for player `i`: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires `[Fintype (G.strategy i)]` but NOT `[Fintype N]`. -/ abbrev EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategy (G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U) (i : N) [Fintype (G.strategy i)] := stdSimplex U (G.strategy i)