EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed
defimported Lean
Embed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {i : N} [Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] (s₀ : G.strategy i) : MixedStrategy G i
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `StrategicGame.pureToMixed`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed← StrategicGame.pureToMixed (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:88): adapted
What was changed in
EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/MixedStrategy.lean:88 (StrategicGame.pureToMixed) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ -/-- Embed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass). -/ -def pureToMixed {G : StrategicGame N U} +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open Finset BigOperators in +variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in +def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {i : N} [Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
- Used by 4
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed_not_isCompletelyMixed_of_neA point-mass mixed strategy is not completely mixed when there is another pure strategy available.
- MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixedDeviate player
whoto pure strategys', keeping others' mixed strategies. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureProfileToMixedEmbed a pure profile as a mixed profile.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in variable {N U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in /-- Embed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass). -/ def EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed {G : EconCSLib.StrategicGame N U} {i : N} [Fintype (G.strategy i)] [DecidableEq (G.strategy i)] (s₀ : G.strategy i) : MixedStrategy G i where val s := if s = s₀ then 1 else 0 property := ⟨fun s => by simp only; split_ifs <;> norm_num, by simp [Finset.sum_ite_eq', Finset.mem_univ]⟩