ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open ExtensiveGame ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile in variable {iota U : Type*} in @[simp] theorem ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same {G : ExtensiveGame iota U} [(s : G.State) -> Fintype (G.Action s)] [DecidableEq iota] (beta : G.BehaviorProfile) (who : iota) (beta' : G.BehaviorStrategy who) : beta.deviate who beta' who = beta'
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Lazyfill (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same← ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/BehaviorStrategy.lean:212): adapted
What was changed in
ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/BehaviorStrategy.lean:212 (ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open ExtensiveGame ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile in +variable {iota U : Type*} in @[simp] -theorem deviate_same {G : ExtensiveGame iota U} +theorem ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same {G : ExtensiveGame iota U} [(s : G.State) -> Fintype (G.Action s)] [DecidableEq iota] @@ -5,2 +9,3 @@ beta.deviate who beta' who = beta' := by - simp [deviate] + unfold ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate + exact Function.update_self .. - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 32
- ExtensiveGameA state-payoff extensive game: a payoff-free controlled game together with a convenient endpoint-state payoff. *
mover s= who controls… - ArenaA game arena: the pure dynamics of an extensive-form game. States, actions, and transitions are stored without players, payoffs, or…
- ControlledGameA payoff-free controlled extensive-game skeleton.
ControlledGameadds only a distinguished initial state and a mover label to the pure… - ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfileA behavior-strategy profile: one behavior strategy for every player.
- ExtensiveGame.BehaviorStrategyA behavior strategy for player
i: at every nonterminal state controlled byi, choose a probability distribution over the actions… - ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviateUnilateral deviation of a behavior profile: player
whoswitches tobeta', while every other player keeps the original behavior strategy. - ControlledGame.ofArena_toArenaControlledGame.ofArena_toArena
- ControlledGame.ofArena_initControlledGame.ofArena_init
- ControlledGame.ofArena_moverControlledGame.ofArena_mover
- ExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_toControlledGameExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_toControlledGame
- ExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_payoffExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_toControlledGame_selfForgetting an existing payoff-aware game and then reattaching its payoff recovers the original game definitionally.
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_toArenaExtensiveGame.ofArena_toArena
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_initExtensiveGame.ofArena_init
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_moverExtensiveGame.ofArena_mover
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_payoffExtensiveGame.ofArena_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.isPlayerState_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware player-state predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.isNonPlayerState_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware non-player-state predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware no-chance predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.isReachable_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware reachability predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_initExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_init
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_moverExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_mover
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_payoffExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_nextExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_next
- ExtensiveGame.subgameAt_initExtensiveGame.subgameAt_init
- ExtensiveGame.subgameAt_moverExtensiveGame.subgameAt_mover
- ExtensiveGame.subgameAt_payoffExtensiveGame.subgameAt_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.subgameAt_nextExtensiveGame.subgameAt_next
- ExtensiveGame.subgameAt_action_fintypeExtensiveGame.subgameAt_action_fintype
- ExtensiveGame.subgameAt_isEmpty_decidableExtensiveGame.subgameAt_isEmpty_decidable
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_action_fintypeExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_action_fintype
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_isEmpty_decidableExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_isEmpty_decidable
- ExtensiveGameA state-payoff extensive game: a payoff-free controlled game together with a convenient endpoint-state payoff. *
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen ExtensiveGame ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile invariable {iota U : Type*} in@[simp]theorem ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same {G : ExtensiveGame iota U} [(s : G.State) -> Fintype (G.Action s)] [DecidableEq iota] (beta : G.BehaviorProfile) (who : iota) (beta' : G.BehaviorStrategy who) : beta.deviate who beta' who = beta' := by unfold ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate exact Function.update_self ..