ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGame
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The historical payoff-aware no-chance predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N : Type*} {U : Type*} in @[simp] theorem ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGame (G : ExtensiveGame N U) : G.NoChance ↔ G.toControlledGame.NoChance
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGame`
- Lean proof
- By xbei, Lazyfill (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGame← ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGame (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/Basic.lean:183): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none — Lean reports it depends on no axioms
- Built on 3
- ExtensiveGame.NoChanceNo chance nodes: every nonterminal state has a strategic mover.
- ControlledGame.NoChanceEvery nonterminal state has a strategic mover.
- ExtensiveGameA state-payoff extensive game: a payoff-free controlled game together with a convenient endpoint-state payoff. *
mover s= who controls…
- Used by 2
- ExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_sameExtensiveGame.BehaviorProfile.deviate_same
- ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_atOn any extracted tree, root-scoped subgame perfection implies root Nash equilibrium through the ordinary
GameTreeequilibrium API.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N : Type*} {U : Type*} in /-- The historical payoff-aware no-chance predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate. -/ @[simp] theorem ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGame (G : ExtensiveGame N U) : G.NoChance ↔ G.toControlledGame.NoChance := Iff.rfl