MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
The strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combines MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium with the profile-expansion bridge lemmas above.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in variable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in theorem MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium : ∃ p : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq A.toStrategicGame p
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium← MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:619): adapted
What was changed in
MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium--- EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:619 (MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium) +++ as compiled here @@ -1,7 +1,13 @@ -/-- **The strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash - equilibrium.** Combines `MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium` with the - profile-expansion bridge lemmas above. -/ -theorem exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium : - ∃ p : StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame, - StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq A.toStrategicGame p := by +set_option autoImplicit true in +set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in +open MatrixGame in +open Finset BigOperators in +set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in +universe u in +variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in +variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in +variable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in +theorem MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium : + ∃ p : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame, + EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq A.toStrategicGame p := by classical @@ -19,24 +25,36 @@ rw [expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero, expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero] - have hdev0 : (StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame + have hdev0 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 0 s') 0 - = StrategicGame.pureToMixed s' := by - simp [StrategicGame.deviateMixed, Function.update] - have hdev1 : (StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame + = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s' := by + simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] + first + | exact Function.update_self .. + | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ + have hdev1 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 0 s') 1 = yy := by - simp [StrategicGame.deviateMixed, Function.update] + simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] + first + | exact Function.update_self .. + | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ rw [hdev0, hdev1, toMixedProfile_zero, toMixedProfile_one] - exact hxx (StrategicGame.pureToMixed s') + exact hxx (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s') · -- Player 1 (column): deviating to pure s' ∈ J cannot improve player 1's payoff. rw [expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_one, expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_one] - have hdev0 : (StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame + have hdev0 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 1 s') 0 = xx := by - simp [StrategicGame.deviateMixed, Function.update] - have hdev1 : (StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame + simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] + first + | exact Function.update_self .. + | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ + have hdev1 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 1 s') 1 - = StrategicGame.pureToMixed s' := by - simp [StrategicGame.deviateMixed, Function.update] + = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s' := by + simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] + first + | exact Function.update_self .. + | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ rw [hdev0, hdev1, toMixedProfile_zero, toMixedProfile_one] - have h := hyy (StrategicGame.pureToMixed s') + have h := hyy (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s') linarith - Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 25
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfileA mixed profile: each player has a mixed strategy. No finiteness constraint on
N(player set can be arbitrary). - MatrixGame.toStrategicGameThe two-player zero-sum strategic game associated with a matrix game. See
MatrixGame.toStrategicGame_isZeroSumfor the proof that this… - MatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEqA mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their expected payoff by deviating to any pure strategy. By linearity…
- EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players
Nand utilities inU. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a… - MatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEqSaddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nash…
- MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibriumMatrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium — over any linearly ordered field. Packages the field-generic saddle
Minimax.minimax… - MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGame.toMixedProfileBuild a
MixedProfileoftoStrategicGamefrom a saddle-point pair. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff for player
whounder mixed profilep.EU(p, who) = ∑_{σ : Profile} (∏_i p_i(σ_i)) · payoff(σ, who)Requires… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixedDeviate player
whoto pure strategys', keeping others' mixed strategies. - MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zeroBridge lemma:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1). Reduces both sides to the canonical double sum… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedStrategyA mixed strategy for player
i: a probability distribution over pure strategies. Requires[Fintype (G.strategy i)]but NOT[Fintype N]. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixedEmbed a pure strategy as a mixed strategy (point mass).
- MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zeroMatrixGame.toMixedProfile_zero
- MatrixGame.toMixedProfile_oneMatrixGame.toMixedProfile_one
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_oneMirror:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 1 = -(A.E (p 0) (p 1)). - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_selfDeviating to the same strategy is the identity.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_sameAt the deviated player, the updated profile returns the new strategy.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.Profile.deviate_of_neAt every other player, the updated profile is unchanged.
- EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.expectedPayoff_add_zeroMixed-strategy version of the zero-sum axiom: expected payoffs sum to
0. - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidableStrategicGame.IsZeroSum.decidable
- MatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MatrixGame inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) invariable [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in/-- **The strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium.** Combines `MatrixGame.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium` with the profile-expansion bridge lemmas above. -/theorem MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibrium : ∃ p : EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MixedProfile A.toStrategicGame, EconCSLib.StrategicGame.IsMixedNashEq A.toStrategicGame p := by classical obtain ⟨xx, yy, hxx, hyy⟩ := A.exists_mixed_nash_equilibrium refine ⟨A.toMixedProfile xx yy, ?_⟩ intro who s' -- Manually split on who ∈ {0, 1} so the substitution makes `who` literally 0 or 1. have hcases : who = 0 ∨ who = 1 := by rcases who with ⟨_ | _ | n, hn⟩ · left; rfl · right; rfl · omega rcases hcases with rfl | rfl · -- Player 0 (row): deviating to pure s' ∈ I cannot improve. rw [expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero, expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zero] have hdev0 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 0 s') 0 = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s' := by simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] first | exact Function.update_self .. | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ have hdev1 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 0 s') 1 = yy := by simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] first | exact Function.update_self .. | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ rw [hdev0, hdev1, toMixedProfile_zero, toMixedProfile_one] exact hxx (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s') · -- Player 1 (column): deviating to pure s' ∈ J cannot improve player 1's payoff. rw [expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_one, expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_one] have hdev0 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 1 s') 0 = xx := by simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] first | exact Function.update_self .. | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ have hdev1 : (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed A.toStrategicGame (A.toMixedProfile xx yy) 1 s') 1 = EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s' := by simp only [EconCSLib.StrategicGame.deviateMixed] first | exact Function.update_self .. | exact Function.update_of_ne (by decide) _ _ rw [hdev0, hdev1, toMixedProfile_zero, toMixedProfile_one] have h := hyy (EconCSLib.StrategicGame.pureToMixed s') linarith