ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_at
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
On any extracted tree, root-scoped subgame perfection implies root Nash equilibrium through the ordinary GameTree equilibrium API.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open ExtensiveGame in variable {N U : Type*} (G : ExtensiveGame N U) in theorem ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_at [TotalPreorder U] {s : G.State} {tree : GameTree N U} (_h : ExtractsGameTree G s tree) {σ : GameTree.Strategy N U} (hspe : GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn σ tree) : GameTree.IsNashAt σ tree
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_at`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_at← ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_at (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/FiniteArenaExtraction.lean:130): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 35
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
IsSubgamePerfect σis global over everyGameTree N U. This predicate… - GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.IsNashAtRoot-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed
GameTreeroot. This is definitionally the existingIsNashEquilibrium, with the… - GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn.toNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection implies Nash equilibrium at the same root.
- ExtensiveGameA state-payoff extensive game: a payoff-free controlled game together with a convenient endpoint-state payoff. *
mover s= who controls… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - ArenaA game arena: the pure dynamics of an extensive-form game. States, actions, and transitions are stored without players, payoffs, or…
- ControlledGameA payoff-free controlled extensive-game skeleton.
ControlledGameadds only a distinguished initial state and a mover label to the pure… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTreeExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree
- GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - ControlledGame.ofArena_toArenaControlledGame.ofArena_toArena
- ControlledGame.ofArena_initControlledGame.ofArena_init
- ControlledGame.ofArena_moverControlledGame.ofArena_mover
- ExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_toControlledGameExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_toControlledGame
- ExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_payoffExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.ofControlledGame_toControlledGame_selfForgetting an existing payoff-aware game and then reattaching its payoff recovers the original game definitionally.
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_toArenaExtensiveGame.ofArena_toArena
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_initExtensiveGame.ofArena_init
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_moverExtensiveGame.ofArena_mover
- ExtensiveGame.ofArena_payoffExtensiveGame.ofArena_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.isPlayerState_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware player-state predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.isNonPlayerState_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware non-player-state predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.noChance_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware no-chance predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.isReachable_iff_toControlledGameThe historical payoff-aware reachability predicate is exactly the canonical controlled-game predicate.
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_initExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_init
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_moverExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_mover
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_payoffExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_payoff
- ExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_nextExtensiveGame.reachableSubgameAt_next
- GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- ExtensiveGame.StrategyA strategy for player
i: at each nonterminal state whereiis the mover, specify which action to take. The nonterminal premise is…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open ExtensiveGame in variable {N U : Type*} (G : ExtensiveGame N U) in /-- On any extracted tree, root-scoped subgame perfection implies root Nash equilibrium through the ordinary `GameTree` equilibrium API. -/ theorem ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_at [TotalPreorder U] {s : G.State} {tree : GameTree N U} (_h : ExtractsGameTree G s tree) {σ : GameTree.Strategy N U} (hspe : GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn σ tree) : GameTree.IsNashAt σ tree := hspe.toNashAt