AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo

defimported Lean

States in the same information set expose equivalent action types.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in
def FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data. info s = none means the state is not in a strategic information set, typically because…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in
/-- States in the same information set expose equivalent action types. -/
def FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo : Prop :=
  ∀ {s t : G.State} {k : G.InfoSet},
    G.info s = some k → G.info t = some k → Nonempty (G.Action s ≃ G.Action t)
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