FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo
defimported Lean
States in the same information set expose equivalent action types.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in def FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo← FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/ImperfectInformation.lean:77): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
info s = nonemeans the state is not in a strategic information set, typically because…
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
- Used by 2
- FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormedRe-rooting a finite imperfect-information game preserves the local information-set well-formedness package.
- FiniteImperfectGame.InfoWellFormedBasic well-formedness package for information-set reasoning.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in /-- States in the same information set expose equivalent action types. -/ def FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfo : Prop := ∀ {s t : G.State} {k : G.InfoSet}, G.info s = some k → G.info t = some k → Nonempty (G.Action s ≃ G.Action t)