FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormed
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Re-rooting a finite imperfect-information game preserves the local information-set well-formedness package.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in theorem FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormed {s : G.State} (h : G.InfoWellFormed) : (G.subgameAt s).InfoWellFormed
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormed`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormed← FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormed (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/ImperfectInformation.lean:91): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAtThe subgame starting at state
s: same finite game data with a different initial state. Extra validity conditions, such as whethersis… - FiniteImperfectGame.InfoWellFormedBasic well-formedness package for information-set reasoning.
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
info s = nonemeans the state is not in a strategic information set, typically because… - FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfoStates in the same information set have the same mover.
- FiniteImperfectGame.SameActionsOnInfoStates in the same information set expose equivalent action types.
- FiniteImperfectGame.NoChanceOnDecisionInfoStrategic information sets are attached only to player-controlled states.
- FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAtThe subgame starting at state
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in/-- Re-rooting a finite imperfect-information game preserves the local information-set well-formedness package. -/theorem FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormed {s : G.State} (h : G.InfoWellFormed) : (G.subgameAt s).InfoWellFormed := by simpa [subgameAt, InfoWellFormed, SameMoverOnInfo, SameActionsOnInfo, NoChanceOnDecisionInfo] using h