FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfo
defimported Lean
States in the same information set have the same mover.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in def FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfo : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfo`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfo← FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfo (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/ImperfectInformation.lean:72): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
info s = nonemeans the state is not in a strategic information set, typically because…
- FiniteImperfectGameFinite imperfect-information extensive game data.
- Used by 3
- Examples.ImperfectInformation.tiny_same_moverExamples.ImperfectInformation.tiny_same_mover
- FiniteImperfectGame.subgameAt_infoWellFormedRe-rooting a finite imperfect-information game preserves the local information-set well-formedness package.
- FiniteImperfectGame.InfoWellFormedBasic well-formedness package for information-set reasoning.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} (G : FiniteImperfectGame N U) in /-- States in the same information set have the same mover. -/ def FiniteImperfectGame.SameMoverOnInfo : Prop := ∀ {s t : G.State} {k : G.InfoSet}, G.info s = some k → G.info t = some k → G.mover s = G.mover t