GS.IsAchievable
defimported Lean
IsAchievable w m j wj says woman wj is achievable for man j: some stable matching pairs them. Recall the codebase convention MatchingMarket M W with M = women, W = men; man j's partner under μ is μ.matchW j.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in variable (w m : Preferences n) in def GS.IsAchievable (j wj : Fin n) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GS.IsAchievable`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.IsAchievable← GS.IsAchievable (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Optimal.lean:78): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis…
- Used by 5
- GS.NoAchievableRejectionRun-state invariant for proposer optimality.
NoAchievableRejection w m ssays: at states, for every achievable pair(j, wj), if man… - GS.daStep_NoAchievableRejectionInductive step (KEY LEMMA).
NoAchievableRejectionis preserved by onedaStep. Also threadsHoldInv(for the old-holder index… - GS.initState_NoAchievableRejectionThe invariant holds vacuously at
initState: no man has proposed yet. - GS.gs_partner_isAchievableThe GS output itself witnesses that
gs.symm jis achievable forj. - GS.galeShapley_isProposingOptimalMen-optimal stable matching (Gale–Shapley 1962, [MSZ 22.10]): in the men-proposing DA, every man's GS partner is at least as preferred…
- GS.NoAchievableRejectionRun-state invariant for proposer optimality.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} [NeZero n] in variable (w m : Preferences n) in /-- `IsAchievable w m j wj` says woman `wj` is **achievable** for man `j`: some stable matching pairs them. Recall the codebase convention `MatchingMarket M W` with `M = women, W = men`; man `j`'s partner under `μ` is `μ.matchW j`. -/ def GS.IsAchievable (j wj : Fin n) : Prop := ∃ μ : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n), Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ ∧ μ.matchW j = some wj