instCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
instanceimported Lean
instCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in instance instCoeFunPrefForallForallProp : CoeFun (Pref A) (fun _ => A → A → Prop)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `instCoeFunPrefForallForallProp`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.instCoeFunPrefForallForallProp← @EconCSLib/Foundation/Preference.lean:148 (EconCSLib/Foundation/Preference.lean:148): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- PrefA bundled weak preference relation. Use this interface when several agents may rank the same outcome type differently. Use…
- Used by 97
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.InstanceA fully general fair-division instance. This allows preferences over complete allocations, so it can express externalities or other global…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.toShareInstanceConvert a cardinal instance to the induced ordinal no-externality instance.
- GS.joinWoman_le_rightGS.joinWoman_le_right
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_sizeSocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size
- GS.joinWoman_mem_menIf
iis manj's join-partner thenjis one ofi's two men. - GS.finalState_NoAchievableRejectionThe invariant holds at
finalState. - GS.StableMatching.partnerMan
j's partner under a stable matching. - GS.daRun_NoAchievableRejection
NoAchievableRejectionis preserved bydaRun(threadingHoldInvand holding-injectivity, both also preserved bydaStep). - GS.mPartnerThe man partnered to woman
iunder a stable matchingμ. - GS.meetMan_eq_orGS.meetMan_eq_or
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IsDictatorAn individual is a dictator exactly when their singleton coalition is decisive.
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisiveSocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisive
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- GS.prefM_strictGS.prefM_strict
- GS.stableJoin_matchMGS.stableJoin_matchM
- GS.StableMatching.gsStable_greatestThe GS output is the greatest stable matching in the men-preference order: every man weakly prefers his GS partner to his partner in…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.UtilityRepresentsSharePrefAn ordinal share instance is represented by a cardinal instance when its weak share preferences agree with the utility-induced weak order.
- GS.stableMeet_isStableThe meet of two stable matchings is stable.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.ShareInstance.toInstanceLift a no-externality fair-division instance to a fully general allocation-preference instance by comparing allocations pointwise through…
- GS.stableMeetThe meet
μ ∧ ν: each woman keeps her more-preferred man; each man keeps his less-preferred woman. - GS.stableMeet_matchMGS.stableMeet_matchM
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- Matching.IsBlockingA pair
(m, w)is a blocking pair for matchingμif bothmandwstrictly prefer each other to their current partners. [MSZ 22.5] - GS.stableMeet_matchWGS.stableMeet_matchW
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.ShareInstanceA no-externality fair-division instance where each agent ranks only the share they personally receive.
- GS.stableMeet_ge_leftGS.stableMeet_ge_left
- GS.meetEquiv_symm_eq_orThe meet woman of man
jis one of his two partners (his worse). - GS.NoAchievableRejectionRun-state invariant for proposer optimality.
NoAchievableRejection w m ssays: at states, for every achievable pair(j, wj), if man… - GS.StableMatching.gsStable_isGreatest
gsStableis the greatest element of the stable-matching lattice. - GS.daStep_NoAchievableRejectionInductive step (KEY LEMMA).
NoAchievableRejectionis preserved by onedaStep. Also threadsHoldInv(for the old-holder index… - GS.initState_NoAchievableRejectionThe invariant holds vacuously at
initState: no man has proposed yet. - Matching.IsIndividuallyRationalA matching is individually rational if every matched agent strictly prefers their partner to being unmatched.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.NonDictatorialA SWF is non-dictatorial.
- GS.meetMan_le_leftGS.meetMan_le_left
- GS.stableMeet_ge_rightGS.stableMeet_ge_right
- GS.joinWoman_injectiveThe join woman-assignment is injective.
- GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- Pref.ofLinearOrderBundle an explicit linear order as a preference.
- GS.wPartner_stableMeetGS.wPartner_stableMeet
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.inducedSharePrefThe share preference induced by a cardinal utility, using the convention that higher utility means weakly better.
- GS.joinWoman_worse_rightDual of
joinWoman_worse_leftwith the roles ofμ,νswapped. - GS.meetMan_mem_womenGS.meetMan_mem_women
- GS.StableMatching.gsStableThe men-proposing Gale–Shapley output, as an element of the lattice of stable matchings.
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.opposed_preferencesOpposed preferences. Let
μbe a stable matching. If manjis matched to womanwjunder another matchingνand **strictly… - GS.meetManWoman
i's more-preferred man acrossμandν. - GS.stableJoinThe join
μ ∨ ν: each man keeps his more-preferred of the two partners; each woman keeps her less-preferred man. - GS.wPartner_stableJoinGS.wPartner_stableJoin
- GS.joinWoman_le_leftGS.joinWoman_le_left
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalitionSocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalition
- GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.stableJoin_matchWGS.stableJoin_matchW
- GS.wPartnerThe woman partnered to man
junder a stable matchingμ(total, since a stable matching of the balanced market is perfect). - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.InstanceAn ordinal divisible-goods instance. The cake is represented by the ambient measurable space
Ω, and shares are subsets ofΩ. - GS.wPartner_eq_iffThe man-of and woman-of partner maps are inverse to each other.
- GS.joinEquivThe join woman-assignment packaged as an equivalence (injective on the finite
Fin n, hence bijective). - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.CardinalInstance.toShareInstanceView a divisible cardinal instance as the induced generic ordinal no-externality instance.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWFA social welfare function maps strict profiles to a weak social preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictatorSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictator
- MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market.
MandWare the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference… - GS.meetMan_worse_rightGS.meetMan_worse_right
- SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveForSocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
- GS.meetMan_worse_leftGS.meetMan_worse_left
- GS.meetEquivThe meet man-assignment packaged as an equivalence.
- GS.joinWoman_worse_leftIf
iis the join-partner of herμ-manj, theniweakly prefers herν-man toj(sojis her worse man). - SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- Pref.ofTotalPreorderBundle an explicit total preorder as a preference.
- GS.opposed_preferences_womenDual of
opposed_preferences: if womanistrictly prefers manmito hercandidate-manmi', thenmistrictly prefers his… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.InstanceAn ordinal indivisible-goods instance.
allGoodsis the finite set of goods to allocate. Each agent ranks bundles of goods, represented… - GS.IsAchievable
IsAchievable w m j wjsays womanwjis achievable for manj: some stable matching pairs them. Recall the codebase convention… - GS.joinWoman_eq_orGS.joinWoman_eq_or
- GS.StableMatching.instPartialOrderMen-preference order:
μ ≤ νiff every man weakly prefers hisν-partner to hisμ-partner (smalleridxOf= more preferred). - GS.StableMatching.matchW_partnerGS.StableMatching.matchW_partner
- SocialChoice.InstanceA generic social-choice instance consists of feasible alternatives together with each agent's preference over the alternative space.
- MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis… - PrefProfileA preference profile assigns each agent a bundled preference.
- galeShapley_isStableGale-Shapley stability: the DA output has no blocking pair. The statement is in the *market* frame (
IsBlocking … (i : M) (j : W)).… - GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveA coalition is decisive if it is decisive for every ordered pair of alternatives.
- Pref.indifferent
p.indiff a b: outcomesaandbare indifferent under preferencep. - GS.meetMan_le_rightGS.meetMan_le_right
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Divisible.MeasureInstance.toShareInstanceView a measure instance as the induced generic ordinal no-externality instance.
- GS.StableMatchingThe type of stable matchings of a one-to-one market.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - GS.stable_matching_perfectIn the balanced full-preference one-to-one market, every stable matching is perfect: every woman and every man is matched. This is the…
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- GS.gs_partner_isAchievableThe GS output itself witnesses that
gs.symm jis achievable forj. - SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- Pref.lt
p.lt a b: outcomeais strictly preferred tobunder preferencep. - GS.joinWomanMan
j's more-preferred partner across stable matchingsμandν. - GS.prefW_strictGS.prefW_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
- GS.galeShapley_isProposingOptimalMen-optimal stable matching (Gale–Shapley 1962, [MSZ 22.10]): in the men-proposing DA, every man's GS partner is at least as preferred…
- GS.meetMan_injectiveGS.meetMan_injective
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in instance instCoeFunPrefForallForallProp : CoeFun (Pref A) (fun _ => A → A → Prop) where coe p := p.rel