AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Matching.IsStable

defimported Lean

A matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {M W : Type*} in
def Matching.IsStable (market : MatchingMarket M W) (μ : Matching M W) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Matching.IsStable`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 4
  • Matching.IsBlockingA pair (m, w) is a blocking pair for matching μ if both m and w strictly prefer each other to their current partners. [MSZ 22.5]
  • MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between M and W. matchM i is the partner of i ∈ M (or none if unmatched). matchW j is the…
  • instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
  • MatchingMarketA two-sided matching market. M and W are the two sides (e.g., men and women, hospitals and residents). Each agent has a preference…
Used by 54

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {M W : Type*} in
/-- A matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5] -/
def Matching.IsStable (market : MatchingMarket M W) (μ : Matching M W) : Prop :=
  ∀ m : M, ∀ w : W, ¬ IsBlocking market μ m w
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