GS.stableJoin_matchM
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
GS.stableJoin_matchM
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in @[simp] lemma GS.stableJoin_matchM (i : Fin n) : (stableJoin μ ν hμ hν).matchM i = some ((joinEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm i)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GS.stableJoin_matchM`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GS.stableJoin_matchM← GS.stableJoin_matchM (EconCSLib/MarketDesign/Matching/Lattice.lean:258): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- Matching.IsStableA matching is stable if it has no blocking pair. [MSZ 22.5]
- MatchingA matching is a partial bijection between
MandW.matchM iis the partner ofi ∈ M(ornoneif unmatched).matchW jis the… - GS.matchM_mPartnerGS.matchM_mPartner
- instCoeFunPrefForallForallPropinstCoeFunPrefForallForallProp
- GS.matchW_wPartnerGS.matchW_wPartner
- GS.stableJoinThe join
μ ∨ ν: each man keeps his more-preferred of the two partners; each woman keeps her less-preferred man. - GS.stableJoin_matchWGS.stableJoin_matchW
- GS.joinEquivThe join woman-assignment packaged as an equivalence (injective on the finite
Fin n, hence bijective). - GS.PreferencesList-based preferences:
prefs iis a full permutation ofFin n, ordered from most to least preferred. - MatchingMarket.ofEquivDataBuild a
MatchingMarket (Fin n) (Fin n)from list-based preference data.some j ≻ some kiffjappears earlier in the list;noneis…
- Used by 3
- GS.wPartner_stableJoinGS.wPartner_stableJoin
- GS.stableJoin_isStableThe join of two stable matchings is stable.
- GS.StableMatching.instLatticeConway–Knuth lattice. The stable matchings of a one-to-one market form a lattice under the men-preference order: the join gives every…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GS in variable {n : ℕ} (w m : Preferences n) in variable {w m} in variable (μ ν : Matching (Fin n) (Fin n)) (hμ : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) μ) (hν : Matching.IsStable (MatchingMarket.ofEquivData w m) ν) in @[simp] lemma GS.stableJoin_matchM (i : Fin n) : (stableJoin μ ν hμ hν).matchM i = some ((joinEquiv μ ν hμ hν).symm i) := rfl