GameTree.zermelo_determinacy
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Zermelo's theorem (determinacy / saddle value). In a finite two-player zero-sum perfect-information game, optStrategy is a saddle point with value value₀ g: * playing optStrategy, player 0 *secures* at least value₀ g against every opponent play (1-variant); * playing optStrategy, player 1 *holds* player 0 to at most value₀ g against every opponent play (0-variant). Hence the game is determined and value₀ g is its value, attained by the pure backward-induction strategy on both sides.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in theorem GameTree.zermelo_determinacy (g : GameTree (Fin 2) ℚ) (hzs : IsZeroSum g) : (∀ σ' : Strategy (Fin 2) ℚ, IVariant (1 : Fin 2) optStrategy σ' → value₀ g ≤ outcome σ' g 0) ∧ (∀ σ' : Strategy (Fin 2) ℚ, IVariant (0 : Fin 2) optStrategy σ' → outcome σ' g 0 ≤ value₀ g)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.zermelo_determinacy`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.zermelo_determinacy← GameTree.zermelo_determinacy (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/Zermelo.lean:319): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 16
- GameTree.value₀Minimax value for player 0 in a two-player zero-sum game. Under zero-sum, this fully determines both players' values (player 1's value…
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_le_value₀_of_iVariant_zeroPlayer 1's security. If player 1 plays
optStrategy(soσ'is a0-variant, leaving player 1's choices fixed), then player 0's… - GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.value₀_le_outcome_of_iVariant_onePlayer 0's security. If player 0 plays
optStrategy(so the deviating profileσ'is a1-variant, leaving player 0's choices… - GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.optStrategyThe canonical backward-induction strategy: at each node, pick a child whose backward-induction value equals the node's value (i.e., a…
- GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy
σstarting from game treeg. Walks down the tree, usingσto pick a child… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - GameTree.IsZeroSumA 2-player
GameTreevalued inℚis zero-sum if at every leaf the two players' payoffs sum to zero. - GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery
LinearOrderis aTotalPreorder. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- **Zermelo's theorem (determinacy / saddle value).** In a finite two-player zero-sum perfect-information game, `optStrategy` is a saddle point with value `value₀ g`: * playing `optStrategy`, player 0 *secures* at least `value₀ g` against every opponent play (`1`-variant); * playing `optStrategy`, player 1 *holds* player 0 to at most `value₀ g` against every opponent play (`0`-variant). Hence the game is determined and `value₀ g` is its value, attained by the pure backward-induction strategy on both sides. -/ theorem GameTree.zermelo_determinacy (g : GameTree (Fin 2) ℚ) (hzs : IsZeroSum g) : (∀ σ' : Strategy (Fin 2) ℚ, IVariant (1 : Fin 2) optStrategy σ' → value₀ g ≤ outcome σ' g 0) ∧ (∀ σ' : Strategy (Fin 2) ℚ, IVariant (0 : Fin 2) optStrategy σ' → outcome σ' g 0 ≤ value₀ g) := ⟨fun _ hiv => value₀_le_outcome_of_iVariant_one g hzs hiv, fun _ hiv => outcome_le_value₀_of_iVariant_zero g hiv⟩