GameTree.IVariant
defimported Lean
Two strategies are i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned by i. I.e., σ' is obtained from σ by changing only player i's choices.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in def GameTree.IVariant (i : N) (σ σ' : Strategy N U) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.IVariant`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.IVariant← GameTree.IVariant (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeSPE.lean:115): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 10
- GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.StrategyA pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context
(mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *… - TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTree.childrenThe full child list at a
Node, as a guaranteed non-empty list. - GameTree.value_LeafGameTree.value_Leaf
- GameTree.value_NodeGameTree.value_Node
- GameTree.valueList_nilGameTree.valueList_nil
- GameTree.valueList_consGameTree.valueList_cons
- Used by 13
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
IsSubgamePerfect σis global over everyGameTree N U. This predicate… - GameTree.IVariant.refl
IVariantis reflexive: any strategy is ani-variant of itself. - GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfectOptimality of
optStrategy: for every subtreeg, every playeri, and everyi-variant deviationσ', the deviating outcome is… - GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgamesIf a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form…
- GameTree.outcome_le_value₀_of_iVariant_zeroPlayer 1's security. If player 1 plays
optStrategy(soσ'is a0-variant, leaving player 1's choices fixed), then player 0's… - GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn.toNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection implies Nash equilibrium at the same root.
- GameTree.value₀_le_outcome_of_iVariant_onePlayer 0's security. If player 0 plays
optStrategy(so the deviating profileσ'is a1-variant, leaving player 0's choices… - GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toSubgamePerfectOnA global subgame-perfect equilibrium is subgame-perfect on every fixed root.
- GameTree.IsNashEquilibriumNash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than
IsSubgamePerfect,… - GameTree.profileStrategy_deviate_variantReplacing player
i's normal-form contingent plan produces ani-variant global tree strategy. - GameTree.zermelo_determinacyZermelo's theorem (determinacy / saddle value). In a finite two-player zero-sum perfect-information game,
optStrategyis a saddle… - GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNESPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open GameTree in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- Two strategies are `i`-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned by `i`. I.e., `σ'` is obtained from `σ` by changing only player `i`'s choices. -/ def GameTree.IVariant (i : N) (σ σ' : Strategy N U) : Prop := ∀ (m : N) (h : GameTree N U) (t : List (GameTree N U)), m ≠ i → σ m h t = σ' m h t