GameTree.Strategy
defimported Lean
A pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context (mover, head, tail), specify one child (bundled with its membership proof). Note: a single Strategy covers all players. Player-i "strategies" are conceptualized as the restriction to nodes where mover = i.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in def GameTree.Strategy (N U : Type*) : Type _
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `GameTree.Strategy`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.GameTree.Strategy← GameTree.Strategy (EconCSLib/GameTheory/ExtensiveGame/GameTreeSPE.lean:66): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - GameTreeA finite extensive-form game of perfect information, without chance. *
Leaf payoff— a terminal state with a payoff vectorN → U. *…
- TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
- Used by 28
- GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPE_onKuhn's theorem, root-scoped SPE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure strategy that is subgame-perfect…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOnRoot-scoped subgame perfection on the subtrees of a fixed root.
IsSubgamePerfect σis global over everyGameTree N U. This predicate… - GameTree.outcome_LeafGameTree.outcome_Leaf
- GameTree.IVariant.refl
IVariantis reflexive: any strategy is ani-variant of itself. - GameTree.zermelo_exists_pure_NEPure root Nash existence for a finite two-player game on
ℚ: theFin 2/ℚinstance ofKuhn_exists_NE. Zero-sum is not needed. - GameTree.profileStrategyCombine a normal-form profile into the global
GameTree.Strategyused by the game-tree evaluator. At each node, the mover's contingent… - GameTree.Kuhn_exists_NEKuhn's theorem, NE form: every finite perfect-information game without chance has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
- GameTree.outcome_zero_sumIn a zero-sum tree, the terminal outcome of any strategy is zero-sum: following any strategy ends at some leaf, and every leaf of a…
- GameTree.optStrategy_isSubgamePerfectOptimality of
optStrategy: for every subtreeg, every playeri, and everyi-variant deviationσ', the deviating outcome is… - GameTree.IsNashAtRoot-scoped Nash equilibrium predicate for a fixed
GameTreeroot. This is definitionally the existingIsNashEquilibrium, with the… - GameTree.IsNashAt.toSubgamePerfectOn_of_hasOnlyRootSubgamesIf a tree has no proper subgames, root Nash equilibrium already implies subgame perfection on that tree. This is the pure finite-tree form…
- GameTree.outcome_le_value₀_of_iVariant_zeroPlayer 1's security. If player 1 plays
optStrategy(soσ'is a0-variant, leaving player 1's choices fixed), then player 0's… - GameTree.outcome_NodeGameTree.outcome_Node
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectA strategy is subgame-perfect (SPE) if, at every subtree, no player can strictly improve their payoff by a unilateral deviation —…
- GameTree.outcome_optStrategy_eq_valueKey lemma: the outcome of the backward-induction strategy equals the backward-induction value vector at every game tree. This is the…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfectOn.toNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection implies Nash equilibrium at the same root.
- GameTree.value₀_le_outcome_of_iVariant_onePlayer 0's security. If player 0 plays
optStrategy(so the deviating profileσ'is a1-variant, leaving player 0's choices… - ExtensiveGame.ExtractsGameTree.spe_on_to_nash_atOn any extracted tree, root-scoped subgame perfection implies root Nash equilibrium through the ordinary
GameTreeequilibrium API. - GameTree.IVariantTwo strategies are
i-variants if they agree on all nodes NOT owned byi. I.e.,σ'is obtained fromσby changing only playeri's… - GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toSubgamePerfectOnA global subgame-perfect equilibrium is subgame-perfect on every fixed root.
- GameTree.IsNashEquilibriumNash equilibrium: no single player can improve their outcome at the root game by unilateral deviation. Weaker than
IsSubgamePerfect,… - GameTree.optStrategyThe canonical backward-induction strategy: at each node, pick a child whose backward-induction value equals the node's value (i.e., a…
- GameTree.zermelo_determinacyZermelo's theorem (determinacy / saddle value). In a finite two-player zero-sum perfect-information game,
optStrategyis a saddle… - GameTree.outcomeThe outcome (terminal payoff vector) of playing strategy
σstarting from game treeg. Walks down the tree, usingσto pick a child… - GameTree.zermelo_exists_pure_SPEPure root-scoped subgame-perfect existence for a finite two-player game on
ℚ: theFin 2/ℚinstance ofKuhn_exists_SPE_on.… - GameTree.Kuhn_exists_SPEKuhn's theorem (existence form): every finite perfect-information game without chance admits a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The…
- GameTree.IsSubgamePerfect.toNESPE ⇒ NE: every subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (at any fixed root game).
- GameTree.isSubgamePerfectOn_iff_forall_subtree_isNashAtRoot-scoped subgame perfection is equivalent to Nash equilibrium at every subtree of the root. This is the pure finite-tree form of MSZ…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N U : Type*} [TotalPreorder U] in /-- A pure strategy for the entire game tree: at every possible node context `(mover, head, tail)`, specify one child (bundled with its membership proof). Note: a single `Strategy` covers all players. Player-`i` "strategies" are conceptualized as the restriction to nodes where `mover = i`. -/ def GameTree.Strategy (N U : Type*) : Type _ := (m : N) → (h : GameTree N U) → (t : List (GameTree N U)) → { c : GameTree N U // c ∈ h :: t }