AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

IsApproxCoarseCorrelatedEquilibrium

defimported Lean

A joint distribution $\sigma$ is an $\varepsilon$-coarse correlated equilibrium ($\varepsilon$-CCE) of game $G$ if each player's gain from any unilateral pure deviation is at most $\varepsilon$: for all $i'$, $\mathrm{rowDevUtil}(\sigma, G, i') \le \mathrm{rowExpUtil}(\sigma, G) + \varepsilon$, and similarly for the column player.

Statement

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Finset BigOperators in
def IsApproxCoarseCorrelatedEquilibrium {M N : ℕ} (G : Game M N)
    (σ : JointDistribution M N) (ε : ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
TCSlib, `IsApproxCoarseCorrelatedEquilibrium`
Lean proof
By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at c8a02591b1e5 (Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.
Verified
07 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 6
  • JointDistribution.rowExpectedUtilityThe row player's expected utility under $\sigma$ in game $G$ is $\sum_{i,j} \sigma_{ij} \cdot u_r(i,j)$.
  • JointDistribution.colDeviationUtilityThe column player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $j'$, while the row player keeps $\sigma$'s row…
  • JointDistribution.colExpectedUtilityThe column player's expected utility under $\sigma$ in game $G$ is $\sum_{i,j} \sigma_{ij} \cdot u_c(i,j)$.
  • JointDistributionA joint distribution $\sigma$ on $\mathrm{Fin}\,M \times \mathrm{Fin}\,N$ is a nonnegative function $\sigma_{ij} \ge 0$ satisfying…
  • GameA finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, specified by a row utility function…
  • JointDistribution.rowDeviationUtilityThe row player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $i'$, while the column player keeps $\sigma$'s…
Used by 1
  • empiricalJoint_isApproxCCENo-regret play yields an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with row utility $u_r$ and column…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Finset BigOperators in
/-- A joint distribution `σ` is an **ε-coarse correlated equilibrium** of `G` if each unilateral commitment to a fixed pure action improves a player's expected utility by at most `ε`. [Rou13-L13, §3]; [Rou13-L17, Prop. 3.1]; [CBL06, §7.4]. Deviation: two players only, with utilities written as explicit sums over `Fin M × Fin N`. -/
def IsApproxCoarseCorrelatedEquilibrium {M N : ℕ} (G : Game M N)
    (σ : JointDistribution M N) (ε : ℝ) : Prop :=
  (∀ i' : Fin M, σ.rowDeviationUtility G i' ≤ σ.rowExpectedUtility G + ε) ∧
  (∀ j' : Fin N, σ.colDeviationUtility G j' ≤ σ.colExpectedUtility G + ε)
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