Game
structureimported Lean
A finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, specified by a row utility function $u_r : \mathrm{Fin}\,M \times \mathrm{Fin}\,N \to \mathbb{R}$ and a column utility function $u_c : \mathrm{Fin}\,M \times \mathrm{Fin}\,N \to \mathbb{R}$. Both players are utility maximizers.
Statement
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in set_option autoImplicit false in open Finset BigOperators in structure Game (M N : ℕ)
- Defined in
- TCSlib, `Game`
- Lean proof
- By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at
c8a02591b1e5(Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.Game← Game (TCSlib/LearningTheory/Minimax/CCE.lean:57): verbatim
- Verified
- 07 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 12
- JointDistribution.rowExpectedUtilityThe row player's expected utility under $\sigma$ in game $G$ is $\sum_{i,j} \sigma_{ij} \cdot u_r(i,j)$.
- empiricalJoint_isApproxCCENo-regret play yields an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with row utility $u_r$ and column…
- JointDistribution.colDeviationUtilityThe column player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $j'$, while the row player keeps $\sigma$'s row…
- empiricalJoint_row_deviation_leRow regret bound gives row deviation bound. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with row utility $u_r$ over $M$ row actions and $N$ column…
- JointDistribution.colExpectedUtilityThe column player's expected utility under $\sigma$ in game $G$ is $\sum_{i,j} \sigma_{ij} \cdot u_c(i,j)$.
- empiricalJoint_rowDeviationUtilityEmpirical row deviation utility as a time average. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, and…
- empiricalJoint_rowExpectedUtilityRow expected utility of the empirical joint distribution. Fix a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, and…
- empiricalJoint_colExpectedUtilityColumn utility of the empirical joint distribution. Consider a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, whose…
- empiricalJoint_colDeviationUtilityColumn deviation utility of the empirical joint distribution. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column…
- IsApproxCoarseCorrelatedEquilibriumA joint distribution $\sigma$ is an $\varepsilon$-coarse correlated equilibrium ($\varepsilon$-CCE) of game $G$ if each player's…
- empiricalJoint_col_deviation_leColumn regret bound gives column deviation bound. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with column utility $u_c$ over $M$ row actions and…
- JointDistribution.rowDeviationUtilityThe row player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $i'$, while the column player keeps $\sigma$'s…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in set_option autoImplicit false in open Finset BigOperators in /-- A finite two-player game with `M` row actions and `N` column actions, specified by separate utility functions for the row and column players. Both players are maximizers. [Rou13-L13, §3.1]. Deviation: the source's games are cost-minimization games; here both players maximize. -/ structure Game (M N : ℕ) where /-- The row player's utility at the action profile `(i, j)`. -/ rowUtility : Fin M → Fin N → ℝ /-- The column player's utility at the action profile `(i, j)`. -/ colUtility : Fin M → Fin N → ℝ