AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

JointDistribution.colDeviationUtility

defimported Lean

The column player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $j'$, while the row player keeps $\sigma$'s row marginal: $\sum_{i} \sigma^{\mathrm{row}}_i \cdot u_c(i, j')$.

Statement

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {M N : ℕ} in
noncomputable def JointDistribution.colDeviationUtility (σ : JointDistribution M N) (G : Game M N)
    (j' : Fin N) : ℝ
Defined in
TCSlib, `JointDistribution.colDeviationUtility`
Lean proof
By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at c8a02591b1e5 (Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.
Verified
07 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 3
  • JointDistributionA joint distribution $\sigma$ on $\mathrm{Fin}\,M \times \mathrm{Fin}\,N$ is a nonnegative function $\sigma_{ij} \ge 0$ satisfying…
  • JointDistribution.rowMarginalThe row marginal of $\sigma$ at row action $i$ is $\sigma^{\mathrm{row}}_i = \sum_{j} \sigma_{ij}$, i.e.\ the probability that the row…
  • GameA finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, specified by a row utility function…
Used by 4
  • empiricalJoint_isApproxCCENo-regret play yields an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with row utility $u_r$ and column…
  • empiricalJoint_colDeviationUtilityColumn deviation utility of the empirical joint distribution. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column…
  • IsApproxCoarseCorrelatedEquilibriumA joint distribution $\sigma$ is an $\varepsilon$-coarse correlated equilibrium ($\varepsilon$-CCE) of game $G$ if each player's…
  • empiricalJoint_col_deviation_leColumn regret bound gives column deviation bound. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with column utility $u_c$ over $M$ row actions and…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Finset BigOperators in
variable {M N : ℕ} in
/-- The column player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the pure action `j'` while the row player's action is still drawn from `σ`'s row marginal. [Rou13-L13, §3]. -/
noncomputable def JointDistribution.colDeviationUtility (σ : JointDistribution M N) (G : Game M N)
    (j' : Fin N) : ℝ :=
  ∑ i : Fin M, σ.rowMarginal i * G.colUtility i j'
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