KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] in lemma KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update (b : I → U) (i : I) (θ : U) (x : BinaryAllocation I) : binarySocialWelfare (Function.update b i θ) x = θ * binaryToAllocation x i + Finset.sum (Finset.univ.erase i) (fun j => b j * binaryToAllocation x j)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update← KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Knapsack.lean:209): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- KnapsackAuction.binaryToAllocationThe
0/1allocation vector associated with a binary allocation profile. - KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfareSocial welfare of a binary allocation profile at valuation profile
b. - KnapsackAuction.BinaryAllocationA discrete knapsack allocation profile: each agent is either selected or not.
- KnapsackAuction.binaryToAllocationThe
- Used by 1
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotoneKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] invariable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] inlemma KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update (b : I → U) (i : I) (θ : U) (x : BinaryAllocation I) : binarySocialWelfare (Function.update b i θ) x = θ * binaryToAllocation x i + Finset.sum (Finset.univ.erase i) (fun j => b j * binaryToAllocation x j) := by have hsum : Finset.sum (Finset.univ.erase i) (fun j => Function.update b i θ j * binaryToAllocation x j) = Finset.sum (Finset.univ.erase i) (fun j => b j * binaryToAllocation x j) := by refine Finset.sum_congr rfl ?_ intro j hj have hji : j ≠ i := by simpa using hj simp [Function.update, hji] cases hxi : x i with | false => rw [binarySocialWelfare, ← Finset.add_sum_erase Finset.univ _ (Finset.mem_univ i)] rw [hsum] simp [Function.update, binaryToAllocation, hxi] | true => rw [binarySocialWelfare, ← Finset.add_sum_erase Finset.univ _ (Finset.mem_univ i)] rw [hsum] simp [Function.update, binaryToAllocation, hxi]