KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare
defimported Lean
Social welfare of a binary allocation profile at valuation profile b.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] in def KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare (b : I → U) (x : BinaryAllocation I) : U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare← KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Knapsack.lean:149): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- KnapsackAuction.binaryToAllocationThe
0/1allocation vector associated with a binary allocation profile. - KnapsackAuction.BinaryAllocationA discrete knapsack allocation profile: each agent is either selected or not.
- KnapsackAuction.binaryToAllocationThe
- Used by 8
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizerKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_geKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_ge
- KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_updateKnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare_update
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotoneKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone
- KnapsackAuction.fractionalGreedyWelfare_ge_zeroOneWelfare_of_optimalIf the ratio-sorted greedy fractional allocation is optimal for the fractional relaxation, then its welfare dominates the welfare of the…
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_mem_feasibleBinaryAllocationsKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizer_mem_feasibleBinaryAllocations
- KnapsackAuction.maximalSocialWelfareThe maximal social welfare over the feasible binary allocation space.
- KnapsackAuction.exists_welfareMaximizerA welfare-maximizing feasible binary allocation, chosen using
List.argMaxOnon the finite space of feasible0/1allocations.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open scoped BigOperators in variable {I : Type*} {U : Type*} [Field U] [LinearOrder U] [IsStrictOrderedRing U] in variable [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] in /-- Social welfare of a binary allocation profile at valuation profile `b`. -/ def KnapsackAuction.binarySocialWelfare (b : I → U) (x : BinaryAllocation I) : U := ∑ i, b i * binaryToAllocation x i