SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment
defimported Lean
The canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule x. Holding all other bids fixed, agent i pays bᵢ xᵢ(b) - ∫₀^{bᵢ} xᵢ(z, b₋ᵢ) dz.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment [DecidableEq I] (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment← SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Myerson.lean:46): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 15
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_quasiLinearUtility_eqUtility under the canonical Myerson payment rule can be written in the standard envelope-friendly form.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedUniqueness of zero-normalized DSIC payment rules: among zero-normalized payment rules, the canonical Myerson payment rule is the unique…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment_zeroNormalizedThe canonical Myerson payment rule is zero-normalized.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingPaymentRuleThe Myerson payment formula associated with the welfare-maximizing knapsack allocation rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentMyerson-payment revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRuleMyerson payment for
virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} in /-- The canonical Myerson payment formula associated with an allocation rule `x`. Holding all other bids fixed, agent `i` pays `bᵢ xᵢ(b) - ∫₀^{bᵢ} xᵢ(z, b₋ᵢ) dz`. -/ noncomputable def SingleParameterMechanism.myersonPayment [DecidableEq I] (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) : ℝ := b i * x b i - ∫ z in 0..b i, x (Function.update b i z) i