AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.AdmissibleSequence

structureimported Lean

An admissible sequence on a matrix game A (Robinson 1951 setup). Records cumulative counterfactual payoff vectors α(t) : J → ℝ (payoff to playing column j against the actual row sequence) and β(t) : I → ℝ (payoff to playing row i against the actual column sequence), together with the row/column choice sequences and the admissibility conditions: * init_bracket — min_j α^j(0) = max_i β^i(0) (the bracket-start condition, MFoGT (i)). * iSeq_best, jSeq_best — at each step the chosen row is in argmax β(t) and the chosen column is in argmin α(t). * α_step, β_step — the cumulative-payoff update by the chosen pure actions, MFoGT (ii). This is the cumulative-payoff encoding of a fictitious-play realisation; see MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay for the empirical-frequency formulation, and the blueprint node for the correspondence α(t)/t = x(t) A, β(t)/t = A y(t) (plus the negligible boundary).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
structure MatrixGame.AdmissibleSequence (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ)
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.AdmissibleSequence`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
/-- An **admissible sequence** on a matrix game `A` (Robinson 1951 setup). Records cumulative counterfactual payoff vectors `α(t) : J → ℝ` (payoff to playing column `j` against the actual row sequence) and `β(t) : I → ℝ` (payoff to playing row `i` against the actual column sequence), together with the row/column choice sequences and the admissibility conditions: * `init_bracket` — `min_j α^j(0) = max_i β^i(0)` (the bracket-start condition, MFoGT (i)). * `iSeq_best`, `jSeq_best` — at each step the chosen row is in `argmax β(t)` and the chosen column is in `argmin α(t)`. * `α_step`, `β_step` — the cumulative-payoff update by the chosen pure actions, MFoGT (ii). This is the cumulative-payoff encoding of a fictitious-play realisation; see `MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay` for the empirical-frequency formulation, and the blueprint node for the correspondence `α(t)/t = x(t) A`, `β(t)/t = A y(t)` (plus the negligible boundary). -/
structure MatrixGame.AdmissibleSequence (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) where
  α : ℕ → J → ℝ
  β : ℕ → I → ℝ
  iSeq : ℕ → I
  jSeq : ℕ → J
  init_bracket :
    Finset.univ.inf' Finset.univ_nonempty (α 0)
      = Finset.univ.sup' Finset.univ_nonempty (β 0)
  iSeq_best :
    ∀ t i', β t i' ≤ β t (iSeq t)
  jSeq_best :
    ∀ t j', α t (jSeq t) ≤ α t j'
  α_step :
    ∀ t j, α (t + 1) j = α t j + A.g (iSeq t) j
  β_step :
    ∀ t i, β (t + 1) i = β t i + A.g i (jSeq t)
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