MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay
defimported Lean
Fictitious play realisation on a matrix game A. At every step n + 1, the row player picks a pure row best-responding to the column player's empirical frequency y_n, and dually for the column player. The n = 0 "warm-up" step is unconstrained (the empirical frequency is undefined before any play has occurred).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in def MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) (iSeq : ℕ → I) (jSeq : ℕ → J) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay← MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/Learning/FictitiousPlay.lean:93): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 7
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy. - MatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instDecidableEqStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses
xagainst pure columnj. - MatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instNonemptyStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- MatrixGame.empiricalFrequencyEmpirical frequency of the first
npure actions of a sequencea : ℕ → I. Forn = 0we fall back to the uniform distribution so… - MatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGameMatrixGame.instFintypeStrategyFinOfNatNatToStrategicGame
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
- Used by 1
- MatrixGame.AdmissibleSequenceAn admissible sequence on a matrix game
A(Robinson 1951 setup). Records cumulative counterfactual payoff vectorsα(t) : J → ℝ…
- MatrixGame.AdmissibleSequenceAn admissible sequence on a matrix game
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] [DecidableEq I] [DecidableEq J] in /-- **Fictitious play realisation** on a matrix game `A`. At every step `n + 1`, the row player picks a pure row best-responding to the column player's empirical frequency `y_n`, and dually for the column player. The `n = 0` "warm-up" step is unconstrained (the empirical frequency is undefined before any play has occurred). -/ def MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlay (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) (iSeq : ℕ → I) (jSeq : ℕ → J) : Prop := ∀ n : ℕ, 0 < n → (∀ k : I, A.Ei k (empiricalFrequency jSeq n) ≤ A.Ei (iSeq n) (empiricalFrequency jSeq n)) ∧ (∀ ℓ : J, A.Ej (empiricalFrequency iSeq n) (jSeq n) ≤ A.Ej (empiricalFrequency iSeq n) ℓ)