MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Helper: writing A.E as an iterated wsum exposes the structure that the saddle-point bounds rely on.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J β) in theorem MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] (A : MatrixGame I J π) (x : stdSimplex π I) (y : stdSimplex π J) : A.E x y = wsum x (fun i => wsum y (A.g i))
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum← MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:404): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 4
- wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot productβ¬α΅₯: definitionally equal,β¦ - MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j⦠- wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- wsumWeighted sum of
- Used by 2
- MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_of_purePure-strategy guarantees give a mixed Nash equilibrium. If
xxguarantees valuevagainst every pure column andyycaps the row⦠- MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum_swapHelper: swap order of the iterated
wsuminA.E.
- MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_of_purePure-strategy guarantees give a mixed Nash equilibrium. If
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J β) in /-- Helper: writing `A.E` as an iterated `wsum` exposes the structure that the saddle-point bounds rely on. -/ theorem MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] (A : MatrixGame I J π) (x : stdSimplex π I) (y : stdSimplex π J) : A.E x y = wsum x (fun i => wsum y (A.g i)) := rfl